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EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PUBLIC PUNITIVENESS: A CROSS-NATIONAL AND MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH

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EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PUBLIC PUNITIVENESS: A CROSS-NATIONAL AND MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH

by

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Deborah Brown Morford (1931-2007)

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EXPLAINING VARIATION IN PUBLIC PUNITIVENESS: A CROSS-NATIONAL AND MULTI-LEVEL APPROACH

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This dissertation explores public attitudes towards criminal punishment in Western societies and seeks to explain why some individuals are more punitive than others. A model of punitiveness with several domains of focus for explaining variation in punitiveness including objective risk of crime, conservative climate, and population diversity at the country level and demographics, conservative worldview and perceptions of crime, law and order at the individual level is tested with data on punitiveness from two multinational surveys using hierarchical logistic regression techniques. Analyses reveal that males, married individuals, and those who are concerned about crime are more punitive. The rest of the findings are specific to the way punitiveness is measured. Individuals younger than age 45, individuals who perceive the police as ineffective and individuals who have been victims of violent crime tend to prefer incarceration for a recidivist burglar. Those who believe in a personal God are more supportive of the death penalty while individuals with higher levels of religiosity are less in favor of the death penalty.

Further, individuals who live in societies with more religious heterogeneity and where public belief in a literal hell is more prominent are most likely prefer a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar and individuals who live in countries with higher levels

of lethal violence are more in favor of the death penalty. Religious heterogeneity and public belief in hell account for 42% of the variation across Western societies in preference for prison for a repeat burglar while homicide rate accounts for over 75% of the variation in support for capital punishment across Western societies. Conservative religious belief at the contextual level appears to be positively related to support for capital punishment indirectly through the homicide rate suggesting that support for the death penalty may be influenced by the normality of lethal violence in society dependent in part on contextual levels of conservative religious belief.

This dissertation enhances the understanding of punitiveness by providing the most comprehensive multi-level study of public punitiveness to date and proves that religious factors, both personal and contextual, are central to understanding variation in attitudes toward punishment.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

On July 22, 2011 Anders Behring Breivik killed nearly seventy people in Norway. First, a bomb planted by Breivik exploded in the government district of Oslo killing and injuring several people. Second, Breivik shot and killed dozens of Norwegians participating in a Labor Party youth camp, and wounded many others. Initially, the media assumed these killings to be the work of Islamic terrorists and it was shocking to many that Breivik, an ordinary-seeming Norwegian, was responsible. In current practice the most severe criminal punishment in Norway is 21 years in prison. To some Norwegians this will be considered an appropriate punishment. A journalist local to Oslo remarked "…in Scandinavian countries it's deeply ingrained that criminals should have a second chance in society." Another Norwegian, Trond Bentestuen hopes that the official response to Breivik will be "more democracy, more tolerance, and more love. People feel those are the values Breivik wants to destroy. The most important thing is to make sure this lunatic is not able to change our values."[1]

To other Norwegians, 21 years in prison is too lenient a punishment for Breivik. Among the blanket of roses placed outside the parliament building in Oslo to commemorate the victims killed by Breivik was yellow sign reading "Putting this man away for 21 years is not enough. We call on all politicians to make him pay dearly for what he has done" and as Breivik and his lawyer entered the courthouse for his initial hearing they were met with some angry shouts from the public. Alex Rione, 24, one of

[1] Theil, Stefan. July 26, 2011. Norway Shooter Gets Off Easy. The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/07/26/norway-shooter-breivik-gets-off-easy-maximum-sentence-is-21-years.html. Last retrieved 9/6/2011

the people gathered outside the courthouse said, "I would have liked to see him (Breivik) get 21 years per person he has killed."[2] [3]

How does the current sociological literature address or explain the current situation in Norway where some citizens are satisfied with the current criminal justice system while others would prefer a system that metes out a harsher criminal punishment for mass homicide? Or more generally, how do sociologists explain divergent attitudes toward criminal punishment in Western societies, not just within a single country, but also across Western countries? Simply, the sociological literature as it currently stands provides little to facilitate our understanding of what influences individual attitudes towards criminal punishment within and across Western countries. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine and explain variation in attitudes towards criminal punishment in Western societies. This project will focus not only on how individual or personal characteristics influence attitudes toward criminal punishment in Western societies but will also consider the national social context as an influence on these attitudes.

Despite the short coming of the current sociological literature in providing significant insight as to why attitudes toward criminal punishment differ in Western societies there does exist a sizable amount sociological and criminological literature dedicated to attitudes towards criminal punishment under the realm of punitiveness. Punitiveness is a popular though rarely defined or theorized concept in the criminological literature [(Matthews 2005); see Unnever and Cullen 2009 for a clear exception)] and

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[2] Paterson, Tony, and Jerome Taylor. July 28, 2011. What turned Anders Breivik into Norway's worst nightmare? The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/what-turned-anders-breivik-into-norways-worst-nightmare-2327214.html. Last retrieved 9/6/2011

[3] Kremer, Josiane, Marianne Stigset, and Stephen Treloar. July 25, 2011. Norway Shooting Suspect Breivik is Orders into Isolation for Four Weeks. Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-24/norway-killing-suspect-may-explain-motives.html. Last retrieved 9/6/2011.

therefore can refer to a wide variety of research including studies investigating individual and public support for severe criminal justice policies such as capital punishment and three strikes laws; the type and severity of criminal punishments individuals prefer for particular crimes; public satisfaction with the courts and evaluations of the courts (are they too harsh or too lenient?); public justifications for criminal punishment (what is the purpose of criminal punishment?); and, more generally, the punitive turn in criminal justice policy seen in several Western countries in the past few decades. Perhaps the common failure to define and theorize punitiveness in prior research is due to its inherent importance. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this dissertation punitiveness is simply defined as how harshly individuals want to punish criminal offenders.

Public punitiveness, or how harshly people want to punish criminal offenders, is important to understand because it reflects a value that is indicative of culture. Several classical figures have noted that the way a society punishes its criminals is a telling indicator of a society's culture. According to Durkheim (1984) [1893]), law and criminal punishment are reflective of collective sentiments and therefore provide insights into a society's morality. Similarly, distinguished sociologist Kai Erikson (1966) argues in Wayward Puritans that the way a community treats its deviants or criminals is indicative of its moral boundaries and identifies those who are valued community members and those who are excluded from the community. Moreover, Winston Churchill acknowledged that public attitudes toward criminal punishment are a reflection of a society's culture. While Home Secretary, Churchill remarked that "the mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the unfailing tests of the civilization of any country"[4]

[4] It is significant that Churchill referred to the public in his remarks. While criminal justice policy may provide a sense of the public's wishes in terms of criminal punishment, these policies do not always reflect public preferences. For instance, in many Western European countries the majority of the public still

It is significant that Churchill referred to the public in his remarks. While criminal justice policy may provide a sense of the public's wishes in terms of criminal punishment, these policies do not always reflect public preferences. For instance, in many Western European countries the majority of the public still favored the use of the death penalty at the time of its abolition (Zimring 2003; Zimring and Hawkins 1986). Therefore, the best way to understand public punitiveness is to study it directly with data collected from individuals.

Despite the importance of understanding attitudes toward criminal punishment and the significant attention punitiveness receives in the extant literature there are still many unknowns about the nature of punitiveness in Western societies. What is known about punitiveness is greatly limited in scope. The vast majority of research on punitiveness is based on data from the United States, a country that is exceptional in the realm of crime and punishment relative to other Western nations.[5] The U.S. is the only Western country with the death penalty and its incarceration rate, currently at 732 per 100,000 population, is 3 to 12 times higher than the mainland incarceration rates of other Western nations. Further, in many jurisdictions within the U.S., juveniles who commit serious criminal offenses are commonly tried in adult court, a practice that is unthinkable in most Western countries (Deitch et al. 2009). Due to these extremes, one cannot assume that the current accumulated knowledge dealing with punitiveness applies to any Western countries outside of the U.S.

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favored the use of the death penalty at the time of its abolition (Zimring 2003; Zimring and Hawkins 1986). Therefore, the best way to understand public punitiveness is to study it directly with data collected from individuals.

[5] See the International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief. Available at: http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate Last retrieved 9/12/2011.

Further, most research on U.S. attitudes toward criminal punishment is not based on nationally representative samples and only examines punitive attitudes at the individual level. Other methodological challenges of this research include small sample sizes and considerable variation across studies in the way punitiveness and the potential correlates of punitiveness are operationalized. As a likely result of these methodological difficulties, the research on punitiveness is plagued with mixed findings as to which individual-level factors are significantly related to punitiveness. Due to the dominance of individual-level studies of punitiveness in the extant literature, there is minimal focus on how the social context may influence individual attitudes toward punishment. The few U.S.-based empirical studies that do consider the relationship between social context and attitudes toward punishment suggest that social context at the neighborhood and national-level can cultivate punitive attitudes (Rankin 1979; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Beckett 1997).

Based on the above, several gaps in the punitiveness literature can be identified. First, not much is known about individual attitudes toward criminal punishment in Western societies beyond the United States underscoring the need for more comparative research on punitiveness. The current dearth of comparative research on punitiveness in Western societies, or how harshly individuals want to punish criminal offenders, is surprising since the comparative approach is quite popular in the study of criminal justice policy across Western societies. There exists in the recent criminological literature a keen theoretical and empirical interest in (1) explaining variation in penal policy among Western nations (Jacobs and Kleban 2003; Lappi-Seppala 2008; Sutton 2000, 2004; Tonry 2001, 2007; Young and Brown 1993) (2) providing explanations for why the U.S. and/or England are, in recent times, more punitive in their penal policies than other Western countries, (Garland 2001; Savelsberg 1994; Tonry 1999; Whitman 2003) and

giving country-specific or Anglophone-country accounts of the rise in punitive penal policies experienced in recent decades (Beckett and Sasson 2000; Roberts et al. 2003; Tonry 1999, 2004).

Most of this work gives public opinion or public attitudes toward punishment a fair amount of attention. Public punitiveness is incorporated into explanations of Western criminal justice policy in various ways. Public punitiveness is either considered as a direct (Lappi-Seppala 2008) or an indirect influence on criminal justice policy, to the extent that public opinion is taken into account during policy making (Jacobs and Kleban 2003; Savelsberg 1994). Public punitiveness is also thought of as a direct and indirect influence on criminal justice policy, as perceived correctly or incorrectly by policy makers (Roberts et al. 2003; Tonry 1999, 2004). By contrast, Garland (2001) does not differentiate between public punitiveness and criminal justice policy treating them as the same from an empirical standpoint and thus provides the same explanation for both. The significant role that public punitiveness has in many explanations of variation in Western penal policies suggests that a better understanding of the influences on public punitiveness will be a welcome addition to the literature as it will provide a more thorough understanding of the determinants of criminal justice policy.

Second, due to the current deficiency in comparative research focusing on Western attitudes toward criminal punishment, the national social context has yet to be adequately considered as influential in determining how harshly individuals want to punish criminal offenders. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a more thorough understanding of public punitiveness in Western societies by addressing these clear gaps in the literature. The focus is limited to Western societies because any significant differences in attitudes towards punishment found between people from different countries that share the same foundational roots, in this case Greco-Roman civilization

and Christianity, and historical-cultural influences such as the Renaissance, The Protestant Reformation, The Enlightenment, and colonialism are more perplexing. Also, a study of punitiveness in the Western world is much more feasible than a world-wide study of punitiveness. At any rate, in order to expand our understanding of punitiveness beyond the U.S. and to begin to understand cross-national differences in public punitiveness, the Western world is a good place to start.

As follows, this dissertation includes a cross-national and multi-level study of punitiveness in Western societies. The primary data in this study consist of two multinational datasets each containing individual-level data on punitiveness. Each dataset has a unique measure of punitiveness. One dataset provides information on punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar while the other supplies information on attitudes toward the death penalty. First, these data are analyzed to more fully understand individual-level influences on punitiveness. What influences attitudes toward criminal punishment at the individual level? Do the same influences apply to all Western societies? Next, country-level data gathered from a variety of sources are incorporated into the analyses in order to explore the influences of social context on attitudes toward punishment and address the following research questions. What aspects of the national social context influence individual attitudes toward punishment? Are they the same aspects predicted by U.S-based research? How much do aspects of the social context at the national level explain variation in public punitiveness across countries?

In this study, a special focus in placed on the influence of religiosity on punitiveness at both the individual and contextual level. Since punitiveness is a value it makes sense to consider the role of religion in the development of punitive attitudes toward criminal punishment. How does religiosity at the individual-level influence punitive attitudes and are these individual-level influences consistent across Western

societies? What role does the religious social context play in shaping individual attitudes toward criminal punishment? How much does the religious social context at the national level account for any variation across Western countries in public punitiveness?

This research will provide a better understanding of attitudes toward criminal punishment so that variations in these attitudes among individuals within the same country or tendencies for individuals in some countries to be more or less punitive than individuals in other countries will be less of an enigma. Indeed, the findings from this study will facilitate a better understanding of the variation in Norwegian and international attitudes toward the appropriate punishment for Andres Breivik (is 21 years in prison enough?) that are sure to receive more media attention once his trial is underway.

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature on punitiveness for the specific purpose of identifying a multi-level theory or model of punitiveness that applies across Western societies. Chapter 3 describes the two multi-national datasets utilized in this study and provides a detailed account of the study design and methods employed to more fully understand punitiveness across Western societies. Chapter 4 describes the variation across Western societies in public punitiveness evident from both data sources and provides a test of the individual-level hypotheses from the multi-level model of punitiveness developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 both report the results of a full test of the multi-level model of punitiveness with each chapter using a different dataset. These tests include evaluations of the country-level hypotheses corresponding to the multi-level model of punitiveness developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 7 provides a summary and discussion of the dissertation findings.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Hypotheses

The purpose of this chapter is to review the sociological and criminological literature in order to identify important components of punitiveness and develop a model to predict punitiveness that can be applied across Western societies. As mentioned in the introduction the extant literature on attitudes toward criminal punishment is largely atheoretical. Definitions of punitiveness and theories of punitiveness are hard to come by. One exception is Unnever and Cullen (2009: 284) who provide a middle-range theory of individual differences in punitiveness defined as "public support for crime control policies that increase the level of punishment for individual offenders." This definition varies from the one used for this study but it is sufficiently similar thereby enabling this theory to inform the current research. To be clear, for the purposes of this study, punitiveness is conceptualized as a judgment regarding the desired severity of punishment—that is, how harshly people want to punish criminal offenders. This may be expressed through support of a particular policy pertaining to punitiveness, for example, the death penalty. However, punitiveness may also be expressed through something less formal than policy. This more inclusive conceptualization of punitiveness is more appropriate for cross-national research given the range of policy environments across different countries.

A study examining attitudes across multiple countries needs to consider both individual and country-level factors that may shape punitiveness. This chapter reviews evidence for the types of variables that should be in a multi-level model. The review begins with existing theory and results regarding individual-level factors and then moves to a discussion of what country-level factors should also inform a model of punitiveness.

Before continuing the literature review on attitudes toward punishment, it is worth reiterating some of the limitations of the research that informs this model. First, the vast majority of this literature is based in U.S. What is known about punitiveness in the United States may not apply to other Western societies or Western society as a whole. A good illustration of this is race. In the U.S. race tends to have a significant influence on attitudes toward criminal punishment. Blacks are often found to be less supportive of the death penalty than whites (Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). A straightforward divide is not as apparent for other attitudes toward punishment. Blacks tend to be more punitive if they fear crime or if crime is a salient concern (Bobo and Johnson 2004; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991; Johnson 2006). Also, Blacks who perceive racial bias in the criminal justice system are found to be less supportive of punitive criminal justice policies (Johnson 2006). Other the other hand, whites who hold prejudiced views toward blacks tend to be more punitive (Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007; Barkan and Cohn 1994). A further complexity of these findings is that racial differences in punitiveness can be crime specific (Rossi, Simpson, and Miller 1985).

Notably, however, any black and white differences in punitiveness are not evident outside of the U.S. For instance, research conducted in Britain does not find differences in punitiveness between blacks and whites (King and Maruna 2009; Wood and Viki 2004). In addition, likely because race has different meanings and implications outside of the United States, international survey data commonly lack information on race. Thus although a model examining U.S. attitudes should surely include race, and although comparative data on race and attitudes in other Western countries would be desirable,

race will not be included in the current models predicting punitiveness across Western societies.

Second, it is noteworthy that many of the research findings on correlates of punitiveness are mixed. For each correlate of punitiveness discussed below there will be some studies with null or opposite findings. This may be due at least in part to great variation in the methodology within the attitudes toward punishment literature. Many research studies pertaining to punitiveness utilize data from limited jurisdictions, such as a single city (McCorkle 1993; Wanner and Caputo 1987; Tygart 1996) or a particular region (Maruna and King 2009). A few of these studies suffer from very small samples of 200 respondents or less (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Tyler and Weber 1982). Also the operationalization of the dependent variable, punitiveness, and the independent variables (e.g. fear of crime) expected to predict punitiveness tend to vary widely across studies. Thus, for simplicity's sake the following review relays common (albeit not always universal) findings on various factors and considers variables that both theory (Unnever and Cullen 2009) and tradition suggest for inclusion. In this review individual-level factors are considered first. The relationship between demographics and punitiveness, personal experiences and punitiveness and social beliefs and punitiveness are explored. A subsequent section considers country-level factors that may influence punitiveness.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CORRELATES OF PUNITIVENESS

Unnever and Cullen (2009) are the first to propose an individual-level theory of punitiveness, and this model offers an excellent way to begin to make sense of the accumulated literature on the correlates of punitiveness. The crux of Unnever and Cullen's (2009) theory is that individual-level differences in punitiveness are due to whether people can empathize with criminal offenders. They argue that Americans can

empathetically identify with criminal offenders by recognizing any distress that may contribute to their criminal behavior and/or by imagining and feeling the pain the offender may experience if punished harshly. More empathetic people are less likely to support punitive criminal justice policies. On the other hand, those who are unable to "put themselves in the offender's shoes" are more likely to favor harsher criminal punishments (Unnever and Cullen 2009: 286-287). This is simple enough. The complexities of the theory lie in the factors that contribute to an individual's ability to empathetically identify with criminal offenders and the fact that empathy is not a static trait.

Specifically, Unnever and Cullen (2009) argue that personal experiences, structural location, group identity and genetic predisposition directly influence empathetic identification. They also indirectly influence empathetic identification by shaping the constructed images of offenders by type of crime and forming social beliefs including racism, religious beliefs and political beliefs. The media and political elites are considered to have great influence on how individuals construct images of offenders. Moreover, constructed images of offenders, social beliefs and empathetic identification have bi-directional influences one another other (Unnever and Cullen 2009: 297) where social beliefs shape the ability to empathetically identify with offenders while the ability to empathetically identify with offenders simultaneously shapes social beliefs. Another key aspect of the theory is that empathy is not stable within individuals. Some individuals may empathetically identify with constructed images of offenders for particular crimes but not others.

Unnever and Cullen (2009) do a service to literature on punitiveness by proposing a provocative theory of punitiveness. Their theory underscores the importance of personal characteristics, experiences and beliefs in shaping individual levels of punitiveness, and they highlight the role that the media and elites can play in shaping attitudes toward

criminal punishment. Unnever and Cullen (2009) also recognize the need to explain differences in punitiveness across societies and conjecture that country-level differences in punitiveness lie in the ability of citizens to individualize offenders. They propose that those societies where criminals are conceptualized more as an "other" or where there is a strong "us" versus "them" mentality between criminals and law-abiding citizens are likely to be more punitive (Unnever and Cullen 2009: 301).

However, their theory is not particularly useful to inform a model of punitiveness to be applied across Western societies. From a practical standpoint, international, or even national, measures of empathetic identification with offenders by crime type would be difficult to develop. Therefore, a direct test of this theory would be very challenging. Some studies have explored the relationship between empathy as a trait and attitudes toward the death penalty (Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2005). These studies use scales or variations of scales such as the Davis Empathy Scale (Davis 1996) that contain items such as "Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems" and "I often have tender and concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me." This is one way to get at empathy and this scale, or other scales designed to capture empathy as a trait, could be added to an international survey that also contains data on punitiveness but empathy as a trait is not the same as empathetic identification with a particular type of offender. Nevertheless, information on empathy as a trait is not included in available international data that also include information on attitudes toward criminal punishment.

Further, Unnever and Cullen (2009) treat individual punitiveness as situation and country-specific. They argue that punitiveness depends on crime type and the way various criminal offenders are portrayed in the media and the wider social environment (Unnever and Cullen: 291). This makes survey measures of empathetic identification more complicated where scales designed to gauge empathy as a trait will not suffice. It

seems that several survey questions would need to be developed in order capture empathetic identification and how it varies by crime type. Identifying crime types of interest may be difficult in an international context since the images of a stereotypical offender for a certain crime as well as the salience of certain crimes may vary across nations. Also, somehow, country-level differences in media portrayal of criminals and the social environment would need to be accounted for in cross-national measures of empathetic identification. It is not readily apparent how this can be done. Due to these challenges and in order to successfully study cross-national differences in punitiveness, variables need to be conceptualized more broadly in a way that will allow standardized measurement and meaningful comparisons across countries.

Drawing on the features of Unnever and Cullen's (2009) model that are promising for a cross-national analysis of punitiveness in Western societies, this study focuses on the individual-level factors they cite. Differences in empathy, and therefore in punitiveness are likely influenced by personal characteristics, experiences and social beliefs. Therefore, the individual-level literature on attitudes toward punishment is reviewed below to identify the demographic, experiential and belief factors that should be incorporated in model of punitiveness that can be applied across Western societies. Three groupings of variables are identified for inclusion in a model of punitiveness to be applied across Western societies: demographics, conservative worldview and perceptions of crime, law and order. Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram of the types of individual-level factors that should be included in a cross-national model of punitiveness. The following review specifically identifies which demographics, perceptions of crime, law, and order and indicators of a conservative worldview that should be incorporated into a model of punitiveness that can be applied across Western societies.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Types of Individual-Level Factors that Influence Punitiveness



Demographics

Researchers always consider the role of demographics in their empirical work on attitudes toward punishment. Apart from race (discussed above), common considerations include gender, education, age, income and marital status. These are often treated as control variables rather than serving as the main topic of interest. Even still, some common trends are apparent. The most common demographics to show a significant relationship to punitiveness are gender and education.

Women are more often than not found to be less punitive than men (Arthur 1993; Miller, Rossi, and Simpson 1991; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007; Kelley and Braithwaite 1990; Hough, Lewis, and Walker 1988; Langworthy and Whitehead 1986; Makela 1966). This is especially the case for attitudes toward the death penalty and the treatment of juvenile offenders. Women tend to be less in favor of the death penalty (Kelley and Braithwaite 1990; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003; Applegate et al. 2000; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Jacoby and Cullen 1998; Cochran and Chamlin 2006) and less supportive of punishing of juvenile offenders severely (Grasmick and McGill 1994; Sprott 1999; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1993; Cullen, Golden, and Cullen 1983). In terms of explanation, some researchers suggest that

women may be less punitive than men due to a greater concern for the well-being of others, and due to an ethic of care and compassion; by contrast, men may be guided by a strong ethic of justice (Applegate, Cullen, and Fisher 2002). In Unnever and Cullen's (2009) terms, the compassionate nature of women may make it easier to empathetically identify with criminals thus leading to preferences for more lenient punishments for criminal offenders. Psychological research does suggest that women report more empathy than men (Eisenberg and Lennon 1983). This may be due to differences in genetic predispositions, biology, or group identity, all factors considered in Unnever and Cullen's (2009) theory but without much explanation. Nevertheless, the literature indicates that gender is an important factor to include in a model of punitiveness.

Previous research on attitudes toward punishment indicates that there is a negative relationship between education and punitiveness in that those who are more educated are less punitive in their attitudes toward criminal punishment (Applegate et al. 2000; Costelloe et al. 2002; Dowler 2003; Grasmick et al. 1993; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003; Kelley and Braithwaite 1990; Maruna and King 2009; Payne et al. 2004; Thomas, Cage, and Foster 1976; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). Again, little theoretical explanation is available since education is usually used as a control variable in analyses involving punitiveness. From an empathy perspective education may expose people to more information on situational influences external to the criminal offender that may shape criminal behavior. That is, as education increases perhaps one is more likely to see how criminal behavior could be influenced by the social environment rather than primarily being due to the disposition of the offender. There is research to suggest that people who attribute criminal behavior to rational choice and personal disposition are more supportive of the death penalty and harsher punishments for criminals than those who perceive social factors such as poverty and other social ills

to be key causes of crime (Cullen et al. 1985; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003). As Unnever and Cullen (2009) argue, this ability to imagine societal influences on criminal behavior could lead to empathetic identification with criminal offenders and thus lower levels of punitiveness.

Age is sometimes found to significantly influence attitudes toward criminal punishment though findings are mixed. Some studies find that older individuals are more punitive than younger individuals (Unnever and Cullen 2007; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003). Some scholars suggest that as people age the more likely they are to have experienced a criminal victimization or know someone who has (Hough, Lewis, and Walker 1988). (The relationship between criminal victimization and punitiveness and fear of crime and punitiveness will be reviewed in the next section on perceptions of crime, law and order). However, at times the relationship between age and punitiveness is crime specific where older individuals are more punitive for some crimes but not others (Kuhn 2002; McCorkle 1993). There are also a couple of studies that find younger individuals to be more punitive (Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1993; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997). Clearly, age is an important factor to include in a cross-national model of punitiveness but the direction of the relationship is not straightforward. The consideration of empathy does not clarify the direction of this relationship as research on the relationship between age and empathy is lacking.

A few studies on punitiveness find income is positively related to punitiveness. Those with higher incomes are more in favor of the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007), harsher courts (Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006) and harsher criminal punishments in general (Maruna and King 2009). This may be due to the fact that people with higher incomes may perceive themselves to be at a higher risk of

criminal victimization because they are more likely to have valuable items for criminal offenders to steal. More affluent individuals may also have difficulty empathetically identifying with some criminal offenders due to being unfamiliar with what it is like to lack financial resources and social capital, a reality that many criminal offenders are sure to suffer. In a related way, in a later section, research supporting the "threat perspective" is reviewed which suggests that dominant groups are more punitive when their dominancy and privilege are threatened by minority groups. Quite possibly, net of education, those with higher incomes may view criminal behavior as more of a threat to their ability to maintain high status in society. Also, high income could reduce empathy for criminals by isolating people (through residential segregation and/or social networks) from contacts with people who commit crimes or come under the scrutiny of the criminal justice system; such contacts may offer some more ways to empathize with a particular offender accused of crime. This possibility is rarely addressed in the literature. One study does consider the relationship between knowing people who have had direct contact with the criminal justice system and punitiveness. However, the study finds no significant relationship between either knowing an arrestee, knowing someone harassed by the police or having visited someone in jail and a conservative criminal justice ideology that is consistent with wanting to punish criminals more harshly (Browning and Cao 1992).

Finally, several studies indicate that those who are married are more punitive (Arthur 1993; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Costelloe et al. 2002; Dowler 2003; Kelley and Braithwaite 1990). Again, greater social ties (through marriage) may generate more threat and concern about what can be lost. That is, married individuals may fear that a child or spouse will fall victim to crime and thus may feel they have more to lose at the hands of crime. This may generate a form of altruistic fear (Warr and Ellison 2000), which could increase identification with and empathy toward a crime

victim rather than an offender. Further, altruistic fear may account for the finding in some studies that older individuals are more punitive than younger individuals. As people age they are more likely to have children, have a greater number of children, and even have grandchildren. Fear of criminal victimization for children and grandchildren may make it difficult to empathetically identify with some criminal offenders. Altruistic fear may also activate concerns about risk of crime. The relationships between fear of crime and punitiveness and perceived risk of crime and punitiveness are further addressed in the next section on the relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and attitudes toward punishment.

Based on the above review of research on the relationship between demographics and punitiveness, it is expected that those living in Western societies who are male, married and have higher incomes will be more punitive while those with higher levels of education will be less punitive. Age is tentatively expected to be positively related to punitiveness due to the likely development of altruistic fear as individuals' families expand with age. Next is a review of the literature on the relationship between perceptions of crime, law, and order and punitiveness.

Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order

Demographics are not the only individual-level factors that may shape punitiveness. A person's perceptions of crime, law, and order may also influence levels of preferred criminal punishment. Specifically, fear of criminal victimization, perceived risk of criminal victimization and perceptions of the police may all influence attitudes toward punishment. Fear of crime and beliefs about the risk of criminal victimization may influence attitudes toward punishment in that those who fear crime or believe their risk of victimization is significant will support harsher criminal punishments in order to

prevent future crime from occurring. In a related way, negative evaluations of police performance could indicate a deep concern with crime and a keen interest in the reduction of crime. If an individual perceives that the police are ineffective in preventing crime they may conclude that criminals need to be locked-up in order to prevent themselves and others from being victimized. These perceptions of police ineffectiveness may promote images of criminal offenders as out-of-control, "wild in the streets" and unable to be contained. Incapacitation may be deemed the only way to prevent criminals from engaging in crime. People may want the criminals who are caught by the police to be punished severely. Beyond these instrumental explanations for punitiveness, those who seriously identify themselves as potential victims of crime may find it extremely difficult to empathetically identify with offenders and thus prefer harsher criminal justice policies.

There is considerable evidence that fear of crime, a higher perceived risk of criminal victimization and overall worry and concern about crime are associated punitiveness or wanting to punish criminals more harshly (Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1992; 1993; Browning and Cao 1992; Dowler 2003; Miller, Rossi, and Simpson 1991; Arthur 1993; Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 1991; Costelloe et al. 2002; Johnson 2006; Hough, Lewis, and Walker 1988; Maruna and King 2009; Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003; Sprott and Doob 1997; Applegate et al. 2000; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Flanagan, McGarrell, and Brown 1985). Previous research also indicates those who think the police are effective in holding crime down, preventing crime and solving crimes have positive perceptions of the courts including the severity of punishments meted out (Flanagan, McGarrell, and Brown 1985), and those who believe the government is doing a good job fighting crime are less likely to support capital punishment (Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003). These findings imply that those who do

not have positive evaluations of the police may have the opposite response and favor harsher punishments for criminals.

The relationships between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness cannot be fully evaluated without also considering the relationship between actual criminal victimization and punitiveness as this is a relationship that has received a considerable amount attention in the criminological literature (Baron and Hartnagel 1996; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1993; Applegate et al. 2000; McCorkle 1993; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006). A common assumption in the research examining the relationship between criminal victimization and attitudes toward criminal punishment is that the previously victimized have a higher stake in the reduction of crime and a vested interest in avoiding further criminal victimization and thus preventing all of the discomforts attached to criminal victimization. Therefore, victims of previous crime may prefer harsher punishments for criminal offenders as a manifestation of wanting to reduce the likelihood of another criminal victimization either for themselves or others. Criminal victimization may also hinder the ability to empathetically identify with criminal offenders as they may more easily identify with other victims of crime.

Contrary to the common expectation that prior criminal victimization leads to preferences for harsher criminal punishments, research typically indicates no significant relationship between criminal victimization and attitudes toward punishment (McCorkle 1993; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Maruna and King 2009; Costelloe et al. 2002; Baron and Hartnagel 1996; Johnson 2006; Cullen et al. 1985; Browning and Cao 1992; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Applegate et al. 2000; Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1992). However, this null finding may be due to the way victimization is commonly measured.

Most measures of criminal victimization in the literature on public attitudes toward criminal punishment are very general and do not distinguish between violent and non-violent victimization. The survey questions used to operationalize criminal victimization usually ask whether the respondent or anyone in the respondent's household has been a victim of crime (Browning and Cao 1992; Costelloe et al. 2002; Maruna and King 2009; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Wanner and Caputo 1987; Baron and Hartnagel 1996), a victim of property or violent crime (Schwartz, Guo, and Kerbs 1992; Johnson 2006), or a victim of a variety of crimes often including both violent and non-violent crimes (Applegate et al. 2000; Arthur 1993; Cullen et al. 1985). Some measures of criminal victimization do ask about frequency of victimization but still do not distinguish between violent and non-violent crimes (Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006).

Previous research has overlooked the possibility that it may only be violent criminal victimizations that yield more punitive attitudes toward criminal offenders. After all, violent victimization is likely to be more unpleasant, have a stronger emotional impact, and be more memorable than non-violent victimization. Empathetic identification with offenders who have committed violent crime may be more difficult than offenders who commit property or victimless crimes. For instance, it may be easier to imagine another's "need" for financial resources or self-medication in the form of drug use but not another's "need" to cause another person physical pain. Therefore, at the very least criminal victimization should be included in a model of punitiveness and efforts should be made to measure previous criminal victimization in a more careful way to fully ensure a null relationship between victimization and punitiveness or reveal any nuances in the relationship between previous criminal victimization and punitiveness.

In the current study, the possibility that severity of prior criminal victimization may generate punitiveness is considered. Ideally, the influence of vicarious victimization of a family member should also be considered as influential on punitiveness independent of personal victimization (Warr and Ellison 2000), however survey questions used to operationalize prior criminal victimization usually do not ask about vicarious victimization nor distinguish between personal and vicarious victimization (e.g. asking about victimization that happened to the respondent or anyone in the respondent's household). The survey data used in this study is no exception and therefore the relationship between vicarious victimization and punitiveness cannot be directly addressed.

Based on the above review of perceptions of crime, law and order and their relationship to attitudes toward criminal punishment it is expected that those living in Western societies who fear crime or perceive their risk of victimization to be high and perceive the police as ineffective will be more punitive. It is also expected that those in Western societies who have experienced violent victimization will be more punitive. Next is a review of the literature on the relationship between conservative religious belief and punitiveness.

Conservative Religious Belief

In addition to certain demographics and perceptions of crime, law, and order, conservative religious belief is likely to promote punitiveness. The relationship between religion and punitiveness is a relatively recent consideration in the attitudes towards punishment literature and several aspects of religion in individuals' lives are considered to contribute to how harshly people what to punish criminal offenders. Previous research finds that belonging to a religious denomination and self identification as a religious or

spiritual person are negatively associated with support for the death penalty and punitiveness in general (Hessing, Keijser, and Elffers 2003; Maruna and King 2009). Religiosity defined broadly as the importance of religion in day-to-day life sometimes reveals itself to be a negative predictor of punitiveness (Grasmick et al. 1993), and at other times no significant relationship is found between religiosity and punitiveness (Applegate et al. 2000; Unnever and Cullen 2006).

Previous research also examines the relationship between church attendance and punitiveness. Several studies reveal church attendance to be negatively related to support for the death penalty. Those who attend church more often are less likely to favor of capital punishment (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Stack, Cao, and Adamczyk 2007; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). This may be due to the feeling of "community" that more frequent church attendance may generate. Those who are part of a church community may be less individualistic and more able to consider the needs of others, especially those in their church community. Church congregations, through volunteers within the congregation, form committees and organize activities to help other congregants and the community in general such as: welcoming committees, funeral committee, food drives, child-care, mission trips, etc (Chaves 2004). Those who belong to such a community, and those most involved in the community, may find it easier to empathetically identify with criminal offenders, especially if the offender happens to be part of the same congregation or if they are of the same religious denomination.

The findings presented so far on the relationship between religiosity and punitiveness suggest that those who consider themselves more religious and attend church more frequently tend to be less punitive but these constructs do nothing to indicate the presence of conservative religious belief. Nonetheless, these aspects of religiosity are

important to consider as predictors of punitiveness alongside religious belief as controls. Catholicism is also an important trait to consider in studies on attitudes toward the death penalty since the death penalty is explicitly opposed by the Catholic Church and the associated likelihood that the majority Catholics will not support the death penalty.

In contrast to mainstream Catholics, conservative Protestants hold religiously conservative beliefs and this group and its associated beliefs have received significant attention in the attitudes toward punishment literature. Popular beliefs among conservative protestants that are expected to promote punitiveness include: (1) the bible is inerrant—leading to literal interpretations of biblical passages promoting revenge and retribution (e.g. "an eye for an eye" Exod 21:24-25); (2) human depravity and sin are rampant; and (3) everyone is sinful and needs to repent and accept salvation through grace. Survey research uses various measures of these beliefs to identify conservative Protestants, especially biblical inerrancy. When events described in the Bible are taken literally no attempt is made to interpret scripture relatively and take cultural context into account (Bruce 1983). These literal meanings promote retribution, emphasized in Judeo-Christian teachings (e.g., Exod. 21:12, 14; 15-25; Lev. 25:17-22; Matt 5: 21-22, Num. 35:30-34) that evil-doers, wrong-doers and criminals should be punished simply because they deserve it (Grasmick et al. 1992). Conservative Protestants are expected to be more punitive because the beliefs that they strongly adhere to based on a literal understanding of the Bible promote retribution and because of the need to be protected from people who are inherently evil. Supporting retribution as a justification for punishment is strongly related to preferences for harsher criminal punishment and more severe criminal punishments such as the death penalty and incarceration (Warr and Stafford 1984) where criminals are incapacitated from further harming society through evil and sin.

A related argument is that conservative Protestants are more punitive because they are more likely to attribute criminal behavior to disposition and not to environmental influences (Grasmick et al. 1993; Grasmick and McGill 1994). There is research to show that dispositional attributions for criminal behavior are associated with punitiveness (Cullen et al. 1985). Considering the popularly held beliefs of conservative Protestants they are unlikely to empathetically identify with criminal offenders who in their eyes are evil and sinful While a few studies do show conservative Protestants to be significantly more punitive in their attitudes toward the death penalty and punitiveness in general (Grasmick et al. 1993; Unnever and Cullen 2006; King and Wheelock 2007) there are many studies that indicate a null relationship between religious fundamentalism and punitiveness (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Cochran, Boots, and Heide 2003; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007; Applegate et al. 2000; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006).

Conceptualizations and images of God are another type of religious belief that may shape attitudes toward criminal punishment. Belief in a punitive God, a conceptualization that is consistent with conservative protestant views of God as vengeful, has been shown to be positively associated with punitiveness while belief in forgiveness and a loving God tend to be negatively associated with punitiveness (Applegate et al. 2000; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006). Those who believe in a loving God may emulate their view of God by feeling more compassion toward criminal offenders, thereby making it easier to empathetically identify with offenders and be less supportive of more severe criminal justice policies. Following the trends in the literature on religiosity and punitiveness reviewed above it is expected that individuals who attend church more frequently and have higher levels of religiosity will be less punitive while individuals with a more punitive, less loving image of God will be more punitive.

Political conservatism, a similar construct to religious conservatism, is another likely influence on attitudes toward criminal punishment. Scholars have made similar arguments as to why religious conservatism and political conservatism are positively related to punitiveness, that is, conservative protestants and the politically conservative are more punitive because they attribute criminal behavior to personal disposition and not factors in the social environment (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Grasmick and McGill 1994). There is quite a bit of evidence that those who are politically conservative are more punitive. Individuals, especially those from the United States, who self-report higher levels of political and social conservatism [e.g. they place themselves on the higher end of a scale ranging from extremely liberal (1) and extremely conservative (7)] tend to be more punitive (Applegate et al. 2000; Baron and Hartnagel 1996; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Browning and Cao 1992; Costelloe et al. 2002; Maruna and King 2009; Stinchombe et al. 1980; Taylor, Schepple, and Stinchcombe 1979; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). Therefore, individuals living in Western societies are expected to be more punitive if they identify as politically conservative. However, conservatism is not something commonly included in international data that also contains data on punitiveness and therefore it will not be included in the proposed model of punitiveness at the individual-level though it will be considered at the contextual level (see section below entitled "Conservative Climate").

So far the influences of personal characteristics (demographics), personal beliefs (perceptions of crime, law and order and religious belief) and experiences (victimization and church attendance) are considered as influential on individual attitudes toward punishment. Next, the influence of social context on individual attitudes towards punishment is explored. As can be gathered from Unnever and Cullen's (2009) theory of

punitiveness, culture may play a role in influencing individual attitudes toward punishment through the depiction and discussion of criminal offenders by elites and the media. They argue that the way the media and elites brand criminal offenders indirectly shapes punitiveness by influencing empathetic identification with offenders. However, social context may also directly influence individual attitudes toward punishment.

It would be hard to believe that punitiveness is not directly shaped by at least some aspects of the broader social environment in which individuals are placed. The social context can have an effect by shaping individual views of what is "normal". For instance, someone who identifies as politically liberal in a very liberal town may have a different idea of what is appropriate than the political liberal living in a more conservative area. In fact, Baumer et al. (2003) argue and demonstrate in their study of spatial variation in U.S. death penalty attitudes, that a full understanding of punitiveness requires the consideration of both individual-level factors and the social environment. Controlling for the compositional influences of demographics, conservatism, religious fundamentalism and other individual-level factors Baumer et al. (2003) find that the level of lethal violence, the size of the black population and the proportion of political conservatives at the neighborhood-level significantly influence attitudes toward the death penalty. They conclude that "a comprehensive understanding of public opinion on capital punishment requires information about both the characteristics of individuals and the social environment in which they live" (Baumer et al. 2003: 867-868). Thus, the next section considers the influence of social context on attitudes toward criminal punishment and identifies country-level factors that should be included in a model that explains attitudes toward punishment across Western societies. Many of the contextual factors that are considered important for inclusion in a model explaining punitiveness across Western societies are extensions of the individual-level factors already identified for inclusion.

COUNTRY-LEVEL CORRELATES OF PUNITIVENESS

Characteristics of the country in which one lives can contribute to an individual's level of punitiveness or how harshly they want to punish criminals and may influence the degree to which individuals can or cannot empathetically identify with criminal offenders. A handful of macro-level studies on public opinion toward crime and multi-level studies on attitudes toward criminal punishment help identify the aspects of the social context that should be considered in a model of punitiveness to apply across Western societies. These studies suggest that objective, social structural and socially constructed factors at the country-level should be considered as influences on attitudes toward criminal punishment. The findings of these studies suggest that the following types of country-level factors should be considered: objective reality of crime, socially constructed realities of crime, population diversity and conservative climate. Figure 2 provides a conceptual diagram of the country-level factors that should be included in a cross-national model of punitiveness. The following review of potential contextual-level influences on attitudes toward criminal punishment specifically outlines the aspects of each type of country-level factor that should be included in a model of punitiveness to apply in Western societies.

Figure 2. Conceptual Model of the Types of Country-Level Factors that Influence Punitiveness



Objective Reality of Crime

There is reason to believe that objective crime rate may influence attitudes toward criminal punishment. Individuals living in countries with higher levels of crime may be more punitive for several reasons. Those living in societies with higher crime rates may be more punitive for instrumental reasons (Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Tyler and Weber 1982), consistent with the ideas previously mentioned such that people favor harsher criminal punishments in order to prevent or deter future crime. Those living in countries with higher violent crime rates have more exposure to violence and thus may be socialized to view violence as normal and therefore view violence or harshness, even violence and severe punishments officially meted out by the state (e.g. the death penalty) as appropriate (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003). High crime rates may also promote punitiveness by breaking down informal social controls which may lead to a sense of insecurity and thus lay a foundation for the support of punitive crime control policies (Garland 2000).

Previous research does find crime rate to be positively related to individual and public support for the death penalty. U.S.-based studies find that high violent crime rates are associated with increased levels of public support for the death penalty (Rankin 1979) and also reveal that individuals living in communities with high homicide rates are significantly more supportive of the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003). In a cross-national study including both Western and non-Western nations Stack et al. (2007) find that individuals living in countries with high homicide rates are more supportive of the death penalty and harsher punishments for criminal offenders. Therefore, it is expected that individuals living in Western societies with higher levels of violent crime will be more punitive than those

who live in Western societies with lower levels of violent crime net of individual-level factors.

Socially Constructed Realities of Crime

Some scholars argue that socially constructed realities of crime, the frequency with which crime is discussed and the way crime is portrayed by elites, such as politicians and the media, influence public opinion on crime and punishment (Beckett and Sasson 2000). Also, recall that Unnever and Cullen (2009) consider the media and political elites to have great influence on how individuals construct images of offenders. There is evidence to suggest that political and media attention to crime can affect public opinion about crime. Beckett (1997) finds that U.S. public concern about crime and drugs is influenced by political attention to crime and drug policy. In the 1970s, U.S. public concern about crime did not precede increases in the severity of criminal punishment but instead followed enhanced attention given to the issue of crime policy by politicians and increased focus on crime by the media. Similar conclusions were made about public concern about drug use in the U.S. in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Attention by politicians (but not the media) to drugs and drug use preceded increases in public concern about drug use (Beckett 1997). Based on the above it is expected that individuals who reside in Western societies where "law and order" messages by politicians are more prevalent will prefer harsher criminal punishments than individuals living in Western societies where the "law and order" messages from politicians are less prevalent. Calls for law and order are often associated with conservative politicians. The next section considers how a conservative climate may influence punitiveness independent of whether or not a person holds a conservative worldview.

But first, there is another socially constructed reality to consider as influential on attitudes toward criminal punishment and that is public perception of police effectiveness. Just as personal perceptions of the police ineffectiveness may promote punitiveness, residing in a country where the wider public perceives the police as ineffective may lead individuals to be more punitive. If negative attitudes toward police performance are common in a society, for example, where individuals are exposed to frequent messages from friends, family and/or the media that police are ineffective in preventing crime from occurring, this may generate a deep concern about crime and a keen interest for the reduction of crime among individuals living in that society. Individuals with more exposure to messages of police ineffectiveness may feel that criminals need to be locked-up in order to prevent themselves and others from being victimized. Incapacitation may be seen as the only legal way to prevent criminals from engaging in crime.

By contrast, individuals living within an environment where perceptions of the police as inadequate are pervasive may decide to take matters into one's own hands by using violence to prevent victimization since the police cannot be relied upon in this regard. Kirk and Papachristos (2011:1191) find that people living in socially disadvantaged neighborhoods while not tolerant of crime and lawlessness, will engage in violence in order to prevent personal victimization due a prevailing culture of legal cynicism where the law and its official enforcers are seen as "illegitimate, unresponsive and ill equipped to ensure public safety." Thus, individuals who live in environments with high levels of legal cynicism, including perceptions of police ineffectiveness, may be more punitive as well as willing to resort to violence in order to prevent future crime. Nonetheless, since this study is focused on punitiveness and not interpersonal violence, it is expected that individuals living in Western societies where public perceptions of police

as ineffective in controlling crime are more pervasive will prefer harsher punishments for criminals.

Conservative Climate

As mentioned in the previous section on individual-level correlates of punitiveness, previous research finds that individuals who self identify as politically conservative tend to be more punitive (Applegate et al. 2000; Baron and Hartnagel 1996; Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Bobo and Johnson 2004; Browning and Cao 1992; Costelloe et al. 2002; Maruna and King 2009; Stinchombe et al. 1980; Taylor, Schepple, and Stinchcombe 1979; Unnever, Cullen, and Bartkowski 2006; Unnever, Cullen, and Fischer 2007). Just as individuals who hold a conservative worldview may be more punitive, individuals living in societies with a conservative climate may also tend to be more punitive irrespective of their personal worldview be it conservative or otherwise. A conservative climate is conceived of here as one where political conservatism and conservative religious beliefs are common. Research does suggest that individuals living in a conservative environment are more punitive. Baumer et al. (2003) find that Americans who live in communities that are more politically conservative (i.e. contain a higher proportion of individuals who self-identify as politically conservative) are significantly more in favor of capital punishment than those who live in less politically conservative communities controlling for personal level of political conservatism and other individual-level correlates of punitiveness. Therefore, it is expected that individuals living in Western societies that are more politically conservative will be more punitive.

While the relationship between conservative religious belief and punitiveness at the individual-level (reviewed in an earlier section) is modestly addressed in the criminological literature, the relationship between conservative religious belief in the

social context and attitudes towards punishment remains unexplored. However, given that those who subscribe to conservative protestant beliefs and politically conservative beliefs are likely to believe that criminal behavior is due to personal disposition and not due environmental factors (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Grasmick and McGill 1994) and that religious conservative belief is tied to ideas of retribution and notions of a great need to be protected from inherent evil as discussed above in the relationship between individual conservative belief and punitiveness, it is expected that individuals living in areas where conservative religious belief is more popular will be more punitive due to similar concerns. Thus, it is expected that individuals who live in societies with higher levels of conservative religious belief (i.e. where conservative religious beliefs are more popular) will be more punitive net of personal religious belief and other individual-level factors.

While the relationship between conservative religious belief at the contextual-level and punitiveness has not been explored in the previous research on attitudes toward criminal punishment, the relationship between religious conservatism at the country-level and lethal violence has been considered. Jensen (2006) argues and provides evidence that societies that have higher levels of conservative religious beliefs, specifically beliefs related to a vengeful God who is in constant battle with the Devil and absolute beliefs about good and evil, have higher levels of lethal violence. Jensen (2006) posits that in societies where these dualistic beliefs about good and evil prevail there exists a culture where people are offended more easily, are not very cooperative, nor very flexible, and where negotiations are difficult due to a perceived lack of "middle ground." This contentious environment yields more conflict and vengeance in terms of lethal violence because God is seen as a vengeful, punitive and personal deity who will use violent means to fend off evil. Based on this argument it is possible that a climate of conservative

religious belief yields a higher homicide rate, which in turn, leads to higher levels of punitiveness. The possibility of a mediated relationship between the context of conservative religious belief and individual-level punitiveness through the homicide rate will be considered in the current study. Besides objective and socially constructed realities of crime and a conservative climate, the social structure such as population diversity may also influence individual attitudes toward punishment.

Population Diversity

Social structural factors such as population heterogeneity and income inequality may influence individual attitudes toward criminal punishment due to the threat of "other" groups encroaching on the privilege of majority groups, or because of a breakdown in normative consensus that may occur in societies with diverse populations in terms of race, ethnicity and religion. Minority threat and economic threat explanations suggest that states or communities in the U.S. with higher proportions of minority populations (usually percent black) and higher levels of economic stratification resulting in a larger economic underclass will have harsher criminal justice policies and public support for these policies due to the threat that the composition of these communities have on the privilege and status of the majority (whites) and the rich (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Baumer et al. (2003) examines the influence of racial and economic threat in U.S. support for the death penalty and finds that Americans living in communities with a higher proportion of blacks are significantly more in favor of capital punishment but does not find a significant relationship between income inequality and death penalty attitudes.

While minority threat makes sense in the United States as an explanation for variation in criminal justice policy and support for these policies, these explanations are

not as easily applied to explain the variation in attitudes toward criminal punishment that occurs in other Western countries or across all Western societies. Individuals in Western societies beyond the U.S. may or may not be threatened by larger proportions of minority populations. If a threatening minority population does exist in countries outside of the U.S., this population is not likely to be uniform in type in terms of race or ethnicity across Western societies. In other words, the traditional conceptualization of minority threat in the U.S. focuses on the proportion of the population that is black and this conceptualization does not apply uniformly across Western societies. The black population may not be perceived as threatening across all Western societies and a threatening minority population may not be readily apparent in some Western societies. Perhaps a better approach to assessing threat or social unrest due to population composition in Western societies is to consider population heterogeneity.

Population heterogeneity is the degree to which two randomly chosen individuals in a society do not belong to the same group (Blau 1977). Two types of heterogeneity that are likely to influence attitudes toward criminal punishment are ethnic and religious heterogeneity. The more ethnic groups there are in a society and the more even these groups are in size, the higher the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in that society. Likewise, the greater the number of religious groups in a population and the more even in size these various religious group are, the more religiously heterogeneous is that population. Higher degrees of ethnic and religious heterogeneity may promote punitiveness in a society because as Blau and Schwartz (1984) argue in their theory of multiform heterogeneity that when individual group membership across a variety of dimensions (ethnicity, religion, etc.) are not highly correlated more opportunities for social interactions across groups are created despite individual tendencies toward homophilly. Even though individuals prefer to spend time with people like themselves, population heterogeneity

infiltrates this tendency and provides more opportunity for interaction between social groups.

This increased intra-group interaction due to population heterogeneity may lead individuals in heterogeneous societies to perceive their society as not uniform. Due to the tendency for individuals to seek out friendships and interactions with those like themselves it is easy for most to feel secure that most people are like themselves and share the same cultural and moral upbringing. However, due to increased exposure to "other" groups in heterogeneous societies through random daily encounters, elite discourse and messages from the media, people living in more heterogeneous societies become more cognizant of the diversity that exists in their society. People become aware that there are others in society that are culturally different from themselves and this can lead to a sense of uneasiness and lack of trust which may ultimately lead to an increased desire to punish criminals more harshly. To the extent that people perceive religious groups that are different from their own as morally inferior or inadequate, religious heterogeneity may be especially influential on attitudes toward criminal punishment since the decision to engage or not engage in criminal behavior can be considered a moral issue.

These dynamics are evidenced in a study by Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) who find, among Northern Californians, that concerns about the breakdown of social bonds, normative consensus and moral cohesion in society spurred by increases in the diversity of society are at the root of support for punitive crime control polices. Based on the above discussion on the potential influences of population diversity on punitiveness it is expected that those living in societies with higher levels of ethnic and religious heterogeneity will be more punitive. Since economic threat can be easily applied to

countries outside of the United States, it is expected that individuals living in countries with greater income inequality will be more punitive.

In sum, the above review has identified several hypotheses about the individual and contextual influences on attitudes toward criminal punishment. Figure 3 provides a detailed multi-level conceptual diagram of the types of individual and country-level influences on attitudes towards criminal punishment including the specific hypotheses pertaining to these influences as they were outlined in this chapter. The next chapter describes the data and methodology used to test these hypotheses.

Figure 3. Multi-level Conceptual Model Predicting Individual Punitiveness



Chapter 3: Description of the Data and Methodology

In order to investigate the influences of punitiveness across Western societies and test the model of punitiveness proposed in the previous chapter, this dissertation utilizes two separate international datasets: (1) the International Crime Victimization Survey (ICVS) and (2) the Voices of the People Millennium Survey (VPMS). Both datasets were obtained through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). Each dataset contains a single measure of punitiveness. In essence, the model of punitiveness is tested twice against two samples and two operationalizations of punitiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data and methodology used in these tests of the proposed model of punitiveness. The ICVS data and variables to be analyzed will be described first followed by a description of the VPMS data and variables that will be analyzed. Next, the country-level variables used in the analyses of both the ICVS and VPMS will be described. Finally, the methodology and plan of analyses will be described. Both datasets (and measures of punitiveness) are subject to the same plan of analyses.

ICVS DATA

Data from nineteen Western countries are found in the ICVS. The main sponsor for the ICVS is the United Nations Interregional Crime in Justice Research Institute in Turin, Italy. The ICVS data were collected in 1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000, with additional countries participating in each successive wave. Investigators administered the ICVS surveys by phone using a standardized method (computer assisted telephone interviewing [CATI]) to persons ages 16 and older (one person age 16 or older in the household was randomly selected to participate). The one exception to this is Poland where surveys were administered face-to-face with computer assistance.

Many countries conduct their own victimization surveys, but they are not ideal to use for comparative research because each country employs their own methods and survey procedures. The ICVS is unique in that it is the only victimization survey that uses a standardized design and procedures across all nations represented in the survey (van Kestern 2003). The most recent year available for each country was used in the analyses resulting in data from the following 19 countries in the given year: Australia 2000; Austria 1996; Belgium 2000; Canada 2000; Denmark 2000; England and Wales 2000; Finland 2000; France 2000; Italy 1992; The Netherlands 2000; New Zealand 1992; Northern Ireland 2000; Norway 1989; Poland 2000; Portugal 2000; Scotland 2000; Sweden 2000; Switzerland 1996; United States 2000. The data is nationally representative of households for each country included in the sample. The sample size for each country ranges from 1,000 to 5,276 resulting in a total sample size of 37, 751.[6] Table 1 describes the subset of ICVS data used for analyses (Country, year, response rate and N). The variation in response rate across countries is notable and this variation is taken into account in the analyses of the ICVS data.

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

Descriptive statistics for all individual-level variables from the ICVS are displayed in Table 2.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable: Punitiveness

Punitiveness was measured by the following ICVS survey question: "People have different ideas about the sentences which should be given to offenders. Take for instance

[6] The ICVS data is not weighted. While the dataset contains a weight variable named "Household Weight" a clear description this variable is absent in the metadata. Furthermore many cases on this variable are missing precluding its use in the analyses. [However, a household weight is not expected to make much of a difference in the results. After all, the samples for each country are nationally representative. The only concern is that small households were over sampled.]

the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time he has taken a colour TV. Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate sentence for such a case? (1) Fine (2) Prison (3) Community Service (4) Suspended Sentence or (5) Other." Respondents who chose "other" were not included in the main analyses, and responses were re-coded into a dummy variable format (1 for prison sentence and 0 for non-prison sentence).

Demographics

The demographic variables available from the ICVS include: gender, age, income, education and marital status. Gender is coded as 0 for female and 1 for male. There are 12 dummy variables for age due to the way age information was recorded by the ICVS. There is one dummy variable for each of the following age categories: age 16 to 19, age 20 to 24, age 25 to 29, age 30 to 34, age 35 to 39, age 40 to 44, age 45 to 49, age 50 to 54, age 55 to 59, age 60 to 64, age 65 to 70, age 70 and above. Age 45-49 is the reference category in all analyses. Income is a dummy variable. Respondents were asked "Could you please tell me whether the income of your whole household, after deductions for tax, etc., is below or above the current median income (provided by the interviewer)?" Above median income is coded as 1. Below median income is coded as 0.

Education is an ordinal variable with twelve categories ranked from lowest to highest. Individuals who completed 0-9 years of education are coded as 1, the lowest category. Categories 2 through 11 represent one additional year of education after 9 years of education. Therefore, a code of 2 represents individuals with 10 years of education and a code of 11 represents individuals with 19 years of education. The final category represents individuals with 20 years of education or more.

The education variable is derived from three different survey questions. Most of the education data comes from the following question: "How many years of formal school and any higher education did you have?" Responses from 0 to 9 were coded as 1, the lowest categories. Responses from 10 years to 19 years were coded as 2 to 11, respectively. Responses of 20 years of education or more were coded as 12. Data for missing cases on the above question were obtained by the following question, if the respondent was asked the following question and provided a response: "How old were you when you completed your full time education at school, college or elsewhere?" Finishing school at ages 15-24 is coded as 2 to 12, respectively. Data missing from both of the above questions were obtained with yet another education question: "How would you define your level of education?" No education, less than primary education, and primary education are coded as 1. Secondary education is coded as 5. College is coded as 8. Higher education or University is coded as 12. Remaining missing data on education (where cases are missing information on all three of the above education questions) were multiply imputed with STATA's ICE procedure that uses a series of logit regression analyses to estimate missing values. Finally, marital status is coded as 1 for married and 2 for other (living together, single, divorced, or widowed).

Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order

The relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness will be tested using data from the ICVS on perceived risk of criminal victimization, attitudes toward the police, and criminal victimization. Perceived risk of victimization is operationalized with an ordinal variable based on the following question: "What would you say are the chances that over the next 12 months someone will try to break into your home? Do you think this is very likely, likely or not likely? "Not very likely" was coded

as 1, "likely" was coded as 2, and very likely was coded as 3. Perceived police ineffectiveness is measured by a single dummy variable based on the following questions: "taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your area in controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, a fairly poor job, or a very poor job?" Respondents who indicated that the police in their area do a fairly or very good job are coded as 0. Those who thought the police do a fairly poor or very poor job are coded as 1. These responses were dichotomized because all four category responses were recorded for the 2000 wave of the ICVS only. Data from 1989-1996 were dichotomized by those coding the ICVS data.

Table 1. Description of ICVS Data used for Analysis (Country, Year, Response Rate, N)

Country	**Year**	**Response Rate (%)**	**Sample Size (N)**
Australia	2000	58	2005
Austria	1996	76	1507
Belgium	2000	56	2501
Canada	2000	57	2078
Denmark	2000	66	3007
England and Wales	2000	57	1947
Finland	2000	77	1782
France	2000	45	1000
Italy	1992	61	2024
Netherlands	2000	58	2000
New Zealand	1992	65	2048
Northern Ireland	2000	81	1511
Norway	1989	71	1009
Poland	2000	78	5276
Portugal	2000	56	2000
Scotland	2000	58	2055
Sweden	2000	66	2001
Switzerland	1996	56	1000
USA	2000	60	1000
Total N			37,751

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for ICVS variables

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Missing	% Missing
Dependent Variable						
Punitiveness						
Prison Sentence N = 34310	0.32	0.47	0	1		
Individual-Level Variables						
Demographics						
Male	0.45	0.50	0	1	0	0
Education	4.36	3.09	1	12	2240	6.53
Age 16 – 19	0.04	0.20	0	1	194	0.57
Age 20 – 24	0.07	0.25	0	1	194	0.57
Age 25 – 29	0.09	0.28	0	1	194	0.57
Age 30 – 34	0.10	0.30	0	1	194	0.57
Age 35 – 39	0.11	0.31	0	1	194	0.57
Age 40 – 44	0.10	0.30	0	1	194	0.57
Age 45 – 49	0.09	0.28	0	1	194	0.57
Age 50 – 54	0.09	0.28	0	1	194	0.57
Age 55 – 59	0.07	0.26	0	1	194	0.57
Age 60 – 64	0.06	0.25	0	1	194	0.57
Age 65 – 70	0.06	0.24	0	1	194	0.57
Age 71 +	0.11	0.32	0	1	194	0.57
Income (abv median)	0.52	0.50	0	1	4005	11.67
Marital Status	0.55	0.50	0	1	1024	2.98
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order						
Perceived Risk of Burglary	1.38	0.58	1	3	2695	7.85
Victim of Violent Crime	0.12	0.32	0	1	34	0.10
Victim of Non-Violent Crime	0.06	0.25	0	1	146	0.43
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness	0.28	0.45	0	1	3838	11.19

The ICVS includes questions about prior criminal victimization for the following crimes: theft from car, car damaged or vandalized, motorcycle theft, bicycle theft, burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, larceny (personal theft) and assault. As an example, the question for burglary is: “Over the past five years did anyone actually get into your house or flat without permission and steal or try to steal something. I am not

including here thefts from garages, sheds or lock-ups?" Two dummy variable were generated to measure prior victimization: victim of non-violent crime and victim of violent crime. Respondents are coded as 1 if they have been victims of violent crime, and 0 if not. Likewise, respondents are coded as 1 if they have been victims of non-violent crime, and 0 if not. Violent criminal victimization includes robbery and assault. Non-violent criminal victimization includes: car theft, car damage, theft from car, motorcycle theft, bicycle theft, personal theft, burglary and attempted burglary. A correlation matrix for all perception of law and order variables from the ICVS is provided in Table 3. The highest correlation between these variables is .16, thus multicollinearity is not much of a concern.

Table 3. Correlation Matrix for ICVS Variables Pertaining to Perception of Crime, Law and Order

	1	2	3	4
1. Perceived Risk of Burglary	1.00	0.07***	0.14***	0.16***
2. Victim of Violent Crime	0.07***	1.00	0.16***	0.06***
3. Victim of Non-violent Crime	0.14***	0.16***	1.00	0.10***
4. Perceived Police Ineffectiveness	0.16***	0.06***	0.10***	1.00

$p \leq .05$ *$p \leq .01$ **$p \leq .001$***

Lastly, in order to maintain the largest sample size and retain as much information as possible for each variable missing data for individual-level independent variables were estimated through multiple imputation using STATA's ICE procedure that uses the appropriate regression techniques (for this data, logit and ordinal regression) for each type of variable (dummy or ordinal). The number of missing cases is listed for each variable in Table 2. Missing data are randomly distributed across countries for every variable except for marital status. All respondents from Norway are missing data on marital status. Nonetheless, five imputations were conducted, yielding five distinct

datasets. All multivariate estimates generated using ICVS data are based on the combined analyses of these five datasets.

VPMS DATA

Data from 19 Western countries are found in the VPMS. The VPMS data were collected by the Gallup International Association 2000. The Western nations represented in the VPMS include: Austria, Canada, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The sample size for each country ranges from 500 to 1395 and each sample is nationally representative (N = 16, 443). The data are weighted. Table 4 describes the subset of VPMS data used for analyses (Country, year, and N).[7]

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES

Descriptive statistics for all individual-level independent variables from the VMPS are displayed in Table 5.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable: Punitiveness

Punitiveness is measured by the following VPMS survey question: "Are you personally in favor or against the use of the death penalty?" The recorded responses are in favor of, against or don't know. Responses were recoded into a binary variable (1 for in favor of the death penalty responses and 0 for against the death penalty responses and don't know). This is a common way to code responses for yes/no survey questions about the death penalty (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Unnever and Cullen 2007; Applegate et al. 2000; Young and Thompson 1995; Rankin 1979; Unnever, Cullen, and

[7] Response rates were not reported in the metadata associated with the VPMS.

Bartkowski 2006). An alternative way to code these responses is to code the "don't know" responses as missing. In any case, the results in this study are not substantively different when the respondents who indicate "don't know" are excluded in analyses.

Table 4. Description of VMPS Data used for Analysis (Country and N)

Country	**Year**	**Sample Size (N)**
Austria	2000	780
Canada	2000	1038
Belgium	2000	1001
Czech Republic	2000	500
Denmark	2000	1001
Finland	2000	1049
France	2000	1006
Iceland	2000	619
Ireland	2000	1395
Italy	2000	1001
Luxembourg	2000	500
Netherlands	2000	902
Norway	2000	552
Poland	2000	968
Spain	2000	602
Sweden	2000	1000
Switzerland	2000	502
United Kingdom	2000	1022
United States	2000	1005
Total N		16,443

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for VPMS Data

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Missing	% Missing
Dependent Variable						
Support for the Death Penalty (N=16443)	0.34	0.47	0	1	0	0
Individual-Level Variables						
Demographics						
Male	0.48	0.50	0	1	0	0
Education	2.93	0.82	1	4	2989	18.18
Age under18	0.05	0.22	0	1	984	5.98
Age 18 – 24	0.12	0.33	0	1	984	5.98
Age 25 – 34	0.20	0.40	0	1	984	5.98
Age 35 – 44	0.19	0.40	0	1	984	5.98
Age 45 – 54	0.17	0.37	0	1	984	5.98
Age 55 – 64	0.13	0.34	0	1	984	5.98
Age 65+	0.13	0.34	0	1	984	5.98
Married/Living Together	0.55	0.50	0	1	297	1.81
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order						
Crime Concern	3.20	0.79	1	4	116	0.71
Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity						
Personal God	0.38	0.48	0	1	485	2.95
Spirit or Life Force	0.37	0.48	0	1	485	2.95
Don't Know What to Think About God	0.13	0.34	0	1	485	2.95
No God, Spirit or Life Force	0.12	0.32	0	1	485	2.95
Religiosity	9.26	4.77	2	17	885	5.38
Catholic	0.48	0.50	0	1	317	1.93

Demographics

The demographic variables include: gender, age, education and marital status. Gender is coded as 0 for female and 1 for male. There are 7 dummy variables for age due to the way information on respondent age was recorded by the VPMS. There is one dummy variable for each of the following age categories: Under 18, age 18 to 24, age 25

to 34, age 35 to 44, age 45 to 54, age 55 to 64, age 65. Age 45 to 54 is the reference category in all analyses. Education is an ordinal variable that represents four categories of education: no education, primary education, secondary education (high school), and university degree. Marital status is coded as 1 for married or living together and is coded as 0 for other (single, separated or divorced). Those married and living together where combined because that is the way data on respondent marital status was recorded for the VPMS.

Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order

The relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness will be tested using data from the VPMS on personal concern about crime. Personal concern about crime is operationalized with an ordinal variable based on the following question: "How concerned are personally about the level of crime in this country? A great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or not all?" Responses were coded so that higher values represent greater levels of concern.

Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity

The most appropriate survey question available in the VPMS to help indicate conservative religious belief is the following: "Which of the following statements comes closest to your beliefs? There is Personal God. There is some sort of spirit or life force. I don't know what to think. I don't really think there is any sort of spirit, God or life force." A dummy variable was created to represent each of the above beliefs. The reference category in all analyses is no belief in any sort of spirit, God, or life force. Belief in a personal God is considered indicative of conservative religious belief, but not at face value. In order to make this assumption religiosity needs to be accounted for. Finally, because being of the Catholic faith strongly suggests a lack of support for the

death penalty due to the position on the subject by the Catholic Church it is also accounted for.

Religiosity is measured with a scale using VPMS data on church attendance and the importance of God. Church attendance is measured with an ordinal variable based on the following VPMS question: "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often than once a year, or practically never? Responses were coded so that higher values represent more frequent church attendance. The importance of God is also measured with an ordinal variable and is based on the following question: "How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate. Ten means very important and 1 means not at all important." These two items were added to create a religiosity scale with an alpha of .70. Lastly, Catholicism is represented by a dummy variable, 1 if the respondent is Catholic and 0 if the respondent is not Catholic.

A correlation matrix for all perceptions of crime, law and order, conservative religious belief, and religiosity variables from the VPMS variables is provided in Table 6.

Table 6. Correlation Matrix for VPMS Variables Pertaining to Perception of Crime, Law and Order, Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Crime Concern	1.00	0.11***	-0.02	-0.04***	-0.09***	0.09***	0.00
2. Personal God	0.11***	1.00	-0.60***	-0.30***	-0.29***	0.48***	0.20***
3 Spirit or Life Force	-0.02	-0.60***	1.00	-0.30***	-0.28***	-0.16***	-0.10***
4. DK What to Think About God	-0.04***	-0.30***	-0.30***	1.00	-0.14***	-0.17***	-0.02***
5. No God, Spirit of Life Force	-0.09***	-0.29***	-0.28***	-0.14***	1.00	-0.31***	-0.14***
6. Religiosity	0.17***	0.59***	-0.13***	-0.23***	-0.45***	1.00	0.31***
7. Catholic	0.00	0.20***	-0.10***	-0.14***	-0.14***	0.32***	1.00

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

Finally, in order to maintain the largest sample size and retain as much information as possible for each variable with missing data in the VPMS, missing data were estimated using multiple imputation. STATA's ICE procedure was used to multiply impute additional VPMS datasets. More specifically, the ICE procedure utilizes the appropriate regression techniques (for the VPMS data, logit and ordinal regression) for each type of variable (dummy or ordinal). Five imputations were conducted, yielding five distinct datasets. Missing data are randomly distributed across countries in most instances and specific information on missing data for the VPMS data are available in Table 5. However it must be noted that all respondents from Poland are missing data on age and education. Data on education is also missing from all respondents from Canada and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, all multivariate estimates generated using VPMS data are based on the combined analyses of these five datasets.

COUNTRY-LEVEL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Country-level data on the objective reality of crime, socially constructed realities of crime, conservative climate, and population diversity were obtained from a variety of sources. These sources are identified below in the explanations of each country-level variable. The descriptive statistics for country-level variables are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. All respondents from both surveys are assigned the values of their country of residence corresponding to the year in which they were given the survey (2000 for the VPMS; 1989, 1992, 1996, or 2000 for the ICVS) or the closest year for which data were available.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Variables for Countries and Years Associated with the ICVS

Country-Level Independent Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Objective Reality of Crime				
Homicide Rate	1.91	1.07	0.80	5.52
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime				
Law and Order as a Political Issue	160.06	159.21	0	649.7
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness	21.26	12.75	7	51
Conservative Climate				
Conservative Religious Belief	13.03	5.05	4.05	21.50
Church Attendance	21.68	16.42	2.66	59.18
Political Conservatism	24.96	11.54	3.09	46.98
Population Diversity				
Ethnic Heterogeneity	0.21	0.21	0.05	0.71
Religious Heterogeneity	0.48	0.26	0.14	0.82
Income Inequality	29.42	4.42	22.50	36.70

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Variables for Countries and Year Associated with the VPMS

Country-Level Independent Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Objective Reality of Crime				
Homicide Rate	1.69	1.09	0.69	5.52
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime				
Law and Order as a Political Issue	150.39	123.63	0	448.12
Conservative Climate				
Conservative Religious Belief	11.85	4.89	4.05	21.50
Church Attendance	19	16.82	2.28	59.18
Political Conservatism	28.21	13.18	3.09	48.71
Population Diversity				
Ethnic Heterogeneity	0.25	0.21	.0586	.7124
Religious Heterogeneity	0.37	0.24	0.07	0.82
Income Inequality	28.45	4.24	22.50	36.70

Objective Reality of Crime

The relationship between objective reality of crime at the country-level and punitiveness is tested with the homicide rate. The homicide rate is a measure of objective risk of victimization. The homicide rate for each Western country was calculated using raw homicide data obtained from Barclay and Tavares (2003) *Home Office Statistical Bulletin 12/03 International Comparison of Criminal Justice Statistics 2000*[8] where they compiled and reported data they collected from statistical sources in an impressive number of countries. Barclay and Tavares (2003) define homicide as the "intentional killing of a person excluding attempts including murder, manslaughter (excluding death by dangerous driving), euthanasia and infanticide but excluding abortion and help with suicide."

Barclay and Tavares (2003) had other crime data available but also provide a warning along with their data that "definitions of offences vary between countries both due to legal differences and statistical recording methods; comparisons may be affected by these differences." In light of this, the homicide rate was chosen to measure the objective reality of crime as it is probably the most reliable measure of crime rates. The definition of homicide is not likely to differ across nations compared to the definitions of other crimes and is the most likely of all crimes to be reported. Thus, using homicide rate to measure objective risk of victimization minimizes the problems commonly associated with cross-national comparisons of crime.

The population data (total mid-year) used in the creation of homicide rates are from the U.S Bureau of the Census, International Database, except for the UK countries. The Census does not provide separate values for England and Wales, Scotland and

[8] This data is available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb1203tabs.xls

Northern Ireland. For these countries population data are from Barclay and Tavares (2003).

Socially Constructed Realities of Crime

The relationship between socially constructed realities of crime and punitiveness is tested using two measures: (1) the degree to which law and order is an issue of focus for politicians and the media; and (2) public perceptions of police ineffectiveness.

Law and order as a political issue is operationalized using data derived from the *Manifesto Dataset* (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). The *Manifesto Dataset* contains information on national parliamentary elections from OECD countries from 1975 to1999 and for most countries from 1945 to 2003. Specifically, the *Manifesto Dataset* provides the quantitative results of a content analysis performed on the party manifestos or political documents providing information on the national political party platform and official stances on political issues for each political party in each national election from 1945 to 2003. Each sentence or quasi-sentence was coded into various areas of political interest and the percentage of sentences or quasi sentences for each area of political interest was calculated and reported.

The policy area of interest for this study is law and order defined in the *Manifesto* codebook as positive mentions of "enforcement of all laws, actions against crime, support and resources for police and tougher attitudes in courts." The *Manifesto* dataset also contains information on the percent of the popular vote that each political party received for every national election. Thus, law and order as a political issue is measured as the percentage of law and order messages in the manifesto of the winning party (received the most votes) multiplied by the percent of the popular vote the winning party received.

The winning party manifesto was chosen for use due to the assumption that the more popular the political party, the more inundated citizens are with political messages from that party during election time and otherwise. Further, the percent vote that the most popular party receives varies by country and degree of inundation with law and order messages may vary with the degree of popularity of the political party that received the highest percent of the popular vote. If the most popular political party in terms of highest number of votes or percentage of votes had a strong law and order message, citizens were more exposed to those messages through the media. The *Manifesto* dataset contains data for Great Britain and thus does not have varying values for England and Wales and Scotland. Therefore, England and Wales and Scotland share the same values for law and order as a political issue.

Public perception of police ineffectiveness is a continuous variable representing the percent of the population that perceive the police as ineffective. This variable is constructed by aggregating the responses by country to the following question from the ICVS: "taking everything into account, how good do you think the police in your area in controlling crime? Do you think they do a very good job, a fairly good job, a fairly poor job, or a very poor job?" More specifically, this variable represents the percent of the national sample from each country who indicated that they thought the police do a fairly poor or a very poor job in controlling crime. Since the VPMS lacks data on public perceptions of the police, the relationship between public perception of police ineffectiveness and punitiveness is examined with the ICVS data only.

Conservative Climate

The relationship between a conservative climate and punitiveness is assessed with measures of political conservatism and conservative religious belief at the country level.

Political conservatism is measured using the *Manifesto* dataset described in the section above. Specifically, political conservatism is operationalized for each country by the percent of the population that voted for a conservative national party. For some countries no conservative parties were running in national elections in the year of the survey or the most recent national election preceding the survey year. In these cases, the percent of the population that voted for nationalist political parties are considered the percent that voted conservative. If countries did not have conservative or national parties running, the percentage that voted for Christian Democratic parties are coded as the percent that voted conservative. Christian Democratic parties are center-right parties, the most conservative party compared to socialist, liberal, communist, agrarian, ecological and ethnic parties in the absence of conservative or nationalist parties.

Conservative Religious belief is measured with data from the World Values Survey[9] (WVS). Three questions from the WVS were used to construct a scale of conservative religious belief: (1) "Which statement comes closest to your point of view about what is good and evil? (A) There are absolute clear guidelines about what is good and evil. These always apply to everyone, whatever the circumstances. (B) There can never be absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil. What is good and evil depends entirely upon the circumstances at the time." (2) "Do you believe in hell?" (3) "Do you believe in sin?" These three items are highly correlated with an alpha of .94 for ICVS countries and an alpha of .92 for VPMS countries. The conservative religious belief scale is the sum of the percentage of the population in each country that (1) indicated that absolute clear guidelines of good and evil comes closest to their point of view (2) believe in hell and (3) believe in sin.

[9] The World Values Survey data are available on-line at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Finally, country-level data on church attendance was collected from the WVS to control for country-level religiosity. Church attendance is a continuous variable representing the percentage of the population that attends church at least once a week. It is based on the following question from the WVS: "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, or never, practically never."

The *Manifesto* dataset and the World Values Survey contain data for Great Britain and thus do not have separate values for Scotland and England and Wales. Thus, England and Wales and Scotland share the same values for political conservatism, conservative religious belief and church attendance.

Population Diversity

The relationship between population diversity at the country-level and punitiveness is evaluated using three separate variables: ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity and income inequality. The heterogeneity data were obtained from Alesina and colleagues (2003)[10] and income inequality data were primarily obtained from the OECD, and when not available from the OECD, the Luxemburg Income study was consulted.

Alesina et al.'s (2003) treatment of "population diversity" is referred to as fractionalization and they provide ethnic and religious fractionalization data for 190 countries. Each type of fractionalization is measured as one minus the Herfindahl index of group shares. This represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals

[10] Data was obtained from Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 8:155-194. More detailed data on group names and group size is available from: http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/papersum.html (retrieved on 4/29/2010)

from the same country belong to different groups. This definition of fractionalization is very similar to the sociological conception of heterogeneity[11] therefore these fractionalization measures are considered population heterogeneity measures. The data that Alesina and colleagues used to compute religious fractionalization were obtained from *Encyclopedia Britannica* for the year 2001.

The ethnicity data Alesina et al. (2003) used to create the ethnic fractionalization measure are from a variety of sources as Alesina and colleagues (2003) wanted to use data as disaggregated as possible and data sources were cross-checked. Alesina et al. (2003) used data from *Encyclopedia Britannica* for Australia (1986), Canada (1991), Czech Republic (1991), Denmark (1996), Ireland (1995), Italy (1983), Luxembourg (1996), Spain (1991) and the United Kingdom (1994)[12] to compute ethnic fractionalization scores. Ethnicity data for Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden were gathered from Levinson (1998) *Ethnic Groups World Wide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. Alesina et al. (2003) consulted the CIA World Fact Book (2000) for ethnicity data for Belgium, Finland and Switzerland. Finally, national census data were the source of ethnicity data for France (1999), New Zealand (1996), and the U.S. (2000).

Income inequality data were primarily obtained from the Organization for Economic and Co-operation and Development [OECD] (2006). Gini-coefficients from the year 2000 provided by the OECD were used as measures of income inequality for Western countries in the sample that participated in the ICVS 2000 [13] wave and the

[11] According to Blau (1977), "the operational definition of the degree of heterogeneity in a population is that two randomly chosen persons do not belong to the same group."
[12] Since Alesina et al. (2003) did not distinguish between England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, all of these countries were assigned the UK value for each population heterogeneity measure.
[13] The OECD also does not provide unique gini-coefficients for England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland. Therefore, the UK gini-coefficient was used for all three countries.

VPMS. The gini-coefficient for Belgium was not available through the OECD, so the Luxembourg Income Study[14] was consulted to obtain Belgium's gini-coefficient for the year 2000. Gini-coefficients from the mid-1990s provided by the OECD (2006) were used for Austria as it participated in the ICVS 1996 wave.

The average of the gini-coefficients given by the OECD for the mid-1980s and mid-1990s were used as the measure of income inequality for Italy and New Zealand as they participated in the ICVS 1992 wave. Also, the OECD only reported a gini-coefficient for Switzerland in the year 2000. Since Switzerland also participated in the 1996 ICVS, the average of the 1992 and 2000 gini-coefficients provided by the Luxembourg Income Study was used as an estimate of income inequality for Switzerland for the ICVS only. Further the OECD, the Luxembourg Income Study and Alesina and colleagues only collected data on the UK and did not disaggregate the data by country. Therefore, Northern Ireland, England and Wales and Scotland have the same values for income inequality, ethnic heterogeneity and religious heterogeneity.

Correlation Matrices are presented for all country-level variables. Table 9 represents a correlation matrix including all country-level variables associated with the ICVS sample. Table 10 displays a correlation matrix including all country-level variables associated with the VPMS sample. Based on both correlation matrices it is apparent that church attendance and conservative religious belief are very highly correlated ($r=.83$, $p <.001$). It is also evident that income inequality is highly correlated to both church attendance ($r=.90$, $p <.001$) and conservative religious belief ($r=.87$, $p <.001$). While church attendance was initially conceptualized as a control variable these correlations

[14] Gini-index data were obtained from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) for Belgium and Switzerland. The data is available at http://www.lisproject.org/key-figures/key-figures.htm. (Last retrieved on 5/23/2008). The Gini-index data provided by the LIS was multiplied by 100 to make it comparable to the Gini-Coefficients provided by OECD for the rest of the countries in the sample.

reveal the inappropriateness of including any combination of conservative religious belief, church attendance and income inequality in the same hierarchical logistic regression model. Therefore, when testing the relationship between conservative climate and punitiveness, the effects of church attendance and conservative religious belief on punitiveness will be assessed separately.

It is also noteworthy that the correlations between many of the country-level variables are very strong despite attaining statistical significance. The only reason they are not statistically significant is because the sample size is only 19 countries.

Table 9. Correlation Matrix for Country-Level Variables Applied to ICVS Data

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Homicide Rate	1.00	0.40	-0.22	0.67	0.49	0.62	0.32	0.46	0.53
2. Law and Order as a Political Issue	0.40	1.00	-0.32	0.29	0.25	0.38	0.57	0.37	0.27
3. Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness	-0.22	-0.32	1.00	0.18	0.51	-0.41	-0.32	-0.59	-0.43
4. Conservative Religious Belief	0.67	0.29	0.18	1.00	0.83***	0.57	0.23	0.41	0.87***
5. Church Attendance	0.49	0.25	0.51	0.83***	1.00	0.32	0.16	0.07	0.80**
6. Political Conservatism	0.62	0.38	-0.41	0.57	0.32	1.00	0.15	0.55	0.34
7. Ethnic Heterogeneity	0.32	0.57	-0.32	0.23	0.16	0.15	1.00	0.35	0.17
8. Religious Heterogeneity	0.46	0.37	-0.59	0.41	0.07	0.55	0.35	1.00	0.26
9. Income Inequality	0.52	0.26	0.43	0.87***	0.80**	0.34	0.17	0.26	1.00

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

PLAN OF ANALYSES

Hierarchical or multi-level logistic regression models of punitiveness are estimated in order to test the model of punitiveness proposed in chapter 2. HLM6 software is used and multiple imputation techniques are employed in estimation. Multi-level models are useful in that they account for the nested nature of the ICVS and VPMS data where individuals are situated within countries. Since residents of the same country

are more likely to be similar to each other than similar to residents of other nations errors are not independent. Hierarchical modeling corrects for this and uses the correct degrees of degrees of freedom for country-level analysis.

Table 10. Correlation Matrix for Country-Level Variables Applied to VPMS Data

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Homicide Rate	1.00	0.24	0.53	0.34	0.42	0.22	0.52	0.42
2. Law and Order as a Political Issue	0.24	1.00	0.33	0.36	-0.14	0.68*	0.35	0.32
3. Conservative Religious Belief	0.53	0.33	1.00	0.87***	0.48	0.24	0.27	0.88***
4. Church Attendance	0.34	0.36	0.87***	1.00	0.36	0.21	0.08	0.08
5. Political Conservatism	0.42	-0.14	0.48	0.36	1.00	0.15	0.47	0.44
6. Ethnic Heterogeneity	0.22	0.68*	0.24	0.21	0.15	1.00	0.18	0.20
7. Religious Heterogeneity	052	0.35	0.27	0.08	0.47	0.18	1.00	0.28
8. Income Inequality	0.42	0.42	0.88***	0.80***	0.44	0.20	0.28	1.00

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

While country-level variation in punitiveness is apparent by observing the frequencies of the dependent variables (see Chapter 4, Table 11) significant variation has to be formally established across countries before multi-level models can be estimated. This variation needs to be established in order to evaluate the strength of each model of punitiveness. Therefore, for this initial step, a two-level, unconditional model is estimated (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) to confirm that there is significant variation between countries in punitiveness.

The equation for the formal unconditional model predicting punitiveness for individual *i* located in country *j* is:

$$\text{Log}\,[p(\text{Punitiveness}_{ij} = 1)/(1-p(\text{Punitiveness}_{ij} = 1))] = \beta_{0j} \quad (1)$$

where β_{0j} (the intercept) is specified at the second level as:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} \quad (2)$$

and u_{0j} represents random error among countries which is assumed to be normal with variance τ. The intercept β_{0j} has a subscript *j* which indicates that each country in the sample has a unique intercept. From this we estimate the amount of variance between countries on the dependent variable of interest (Punitiveness_{ij}) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

Now that significant variation between countries in punitiveness has been established equation 1 is expanded to include individual-level variables (such as Education_{ij}):

$$\text{Log}\,[p(\text{Punitiveness}_{ij}=1)/(1-p(\text{Punitiveness}_{ij}=1))] = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}\,\text{Education}_{ij} \quad (3)$$

The next chapter (chapter 4) reports the unconditional model (equation 1 above) and the expansion of this model to include individual-level variables (equation 3 above) for the ICVS measure of punitiveness or preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Chapter 4 also reports the same models for the VPMS measure of punitiveness or support for the death penalty. Equation 2 above can also be expanded to include independent country-level variables that may explain a proportion of the variance in punitiveness between countries. In this way, the unique effects of living in a particular Western country are estimated at level 2, the country level (*j):*

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\text{Homicide Rate}_j + u_{0j} \quad (4)$$

Therefore, γ_{01} represents the effect of the country-level homicide rate (Homicide Rate_j) on individual punitive attitudes (Punitiveness_{ij}). Theoretically, individuals living in countries with different values on the Homicide Rate_j will have different likelihoods of being punitive (Punitiveness_{ij}), either preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar

or supporting the death penalty. Chapter 5 reports estimates of equation 4 above for punitiveness conceptualized as preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar. Chapter 6 reports estimates of equation 4 above for punitiveness conceptualized as support for the death penalty.

All models are estimated with the HLM6 software (Raudenbush et al. 2004) using the multiple imputation option based on Rubin's (1987) formulas. All individual-level independent ordinal variables are centered around the grand mean which means that individual values are converted into deviations from the overall sample mean. Individual-level independent variables that are binary are left uncentered. Country-level independent variables (they are all continuous) are also centered around the grand mean. Therefore, the intercepts in all multi-level logistic regression models (equation 4 above) can be interpreted as the odds of being punitive for the hypothetical Western citizen who belongs to the suppressed category for all dummy variables, who is average on all ordinal-level variables, and who lives in a hypothetical Western country that is average on all country-level variables. Lastly, chapter 7 is the conclusion of the dissertation where the findings are summarized and the implications of the findings are discussed.

Chapter 4: Variation in Punitiveness Across Western Societies and Individual-Level Influences on Punitiveness

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and assess the variation in public punitiveness across Western societies and to investigate individual-level influences on punitiveness. Table 11 displays variation in punitiveness across Western societies for both measures of punitiveness. In this table countries are listed in descending order on punitiveness. The country with the greatest amount of public support for prison as punishment for a second burglary conviction is listed first.

Table 11 reveals some congruence between countries on both indicators of punitiveness. Those countries that are most in favor of prison are also most in favor of the death penalty. The United States is the most punitive in terms of preference for prison and support for the death penalty, with U.S. citizens slightly more in favor of the existence of death penalty than they prefer prison sentences to be meted out for repeat burglary offenders. The UK and Canada are right below the U.S. in terms of punitiveness for both preference for prison and support for the death penalty; however, those from the UK and Canada are less in favor of the death penalty than they are in support of a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar. Other than the above observations, few similarities are found in the ordering of countries for both measures of punitiveness. While citizens in Italy, Denmark and Norway seem to favor prison and the death penalty at similar levels within their country, most countries differ considerably in the degree to which their citizens support prison as an appropriate punishment for a recidivist burglar and the extent to which they support the practice of the death penalty.

Table 11. Countries Ranked by Percentage of Public Support for a Recidivist Burglar and Support for the Death Penalty

Country	Rank	Prison Sentence	Rank	Death Penalty
USA	1	63.94%	1	67.96%
Northern Ireland*	2	57.71%	3	50.29%
Scotland	3	56.49%	3	50.29%
England and Wales	4	54.87%	3	50.29%
Canada	5	49.33%	5	47.88%
Netherlands	6	41.28%	8	35.37%
Australia	7	40.81%	--	---
Sweden	8	32.44%	16	17.70%
Portugal	9	27.83%	---	---
New Zealand	10	27.56%	---	---
Italy	11	26.62%	11	26.77%
Poland	12	22.96%	4	49.17%
Belgium	13	21.58%	7	39.86%
Denmark	14	20.96%	14	19.48%
Finland	15	19.49%	9	35.27%
Norway	16	14.75%	18	15.58%
France	17	12.66%	6	41.75%
Switzerland	18	10.61%	13	25.10%
Austria	19	10.49%	12	25.51%
Czech Republic	--	---	2	59.50%
Luxembourg	--	---	10	32.80%
Spain	--	---	15	19.27%
Ireland	--	---	17	17.56%
Iceland	--	---	19	13.41%

*N. Ireland, Scotland, and England and Wales have the same values for the Death Penalty because the VPMS did not disaggregate the UK countries

Within countries there is, more often than not, a higher degree of support for the use of the death penalty as a punishment in general than there is preference for prison as a criminal punishment for a recidivist burglar. France, one of the countries with the least support for prison as a response to repeat burglary (less than 13% support), has over triple this amount of support for the overall use of death penalty. Switzerland which has even less public preference for prison as a punishment for a second burglary offense than

France (less than 11% support), has over double this amount of support for the death penalty. Poland, fourth place among the countries of interest in support of the death penalty with 49% of public support, has less than half this amount of support for the use of prison as a punishment for a recidivist burglar. Belgium and Finland also retain more public support for the general use of the death penalty at nearly 40% for Belgium and 35% for Finland than support for sending a repeat burglar to prison with only 21.5% support in Belgium and 19% support in Finland.

The Netherlands and Sweden have the opposite trend of the above countries in that the citizens of the Netherlands and Sweden favor the use of prison for a recidivist burglar more than the use of the death penalty in general. While the 32% of the Swedish public favors prison for a repeat burglar, only 18% are in favor of the general use of the death penalty. In a similar, though not nearly as dramatic way, public support for prison as punishment for a second burglary offense is 41% in the Netherlands while support for the death penalty as a criminal punishment in the Netherlands is 35%.

No information on public support for the death penalty is available in the VPMS for New Zealand, Australia and Portugal and no information on punishment preferences for a recidivist burglary is available in the ICVS for the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Ireland and Iceland. Thus, comparisons within these countries on support for these two criminal justice policies cannot be made.

Variation across Western countries in punitiveness is very apparent across Western countries in Table 11. The range of public support for prison as an appropriate sentence for repeat burglary is 10.5% (Austria) to 64% (U.S) while the range of public support for the death penalty is 13% (Iceland) to 68% (U.S.) with the remaining countries pretty evenly distributed within these ranges. While the variation in both measures of punitiveness is clearly indicated in the above tables, the variation needs to be statistically

established in order to fully test the multi-level model of punitiveness proposed in Chapter 2. This is done by estimating an unconditional model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Model 1, Table 12 displays an unconditional model for punitiveness measured as preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Model 1, Table 13 shows an unconditional model for punitiveness measured as support for the death penalty. Estimates from both unconditional models reveal significant variation across countries for each measure of punitiveness ($\hat{\tau}$ = .720, p =.000 for preference for prison and $\hat{\tau}$ = .714, p =.000 for support for the death penalty). These estimates indicate that the degree of variation across countries in punitiveness is quite similar for both measures of punitiveness.

Tables 12 and 13 also display a conditional model (model 2) that includes the individual-level variables proposed to be associated with punitiveness. Model 2, Table 12 tests the individual-level hypotheses about punitiveness concerning demographics and perceptions of crime, law and order with data from the ICVS. In terms of the relationships between demographics and punitiveness, recall that women and individuals with more education are expected to be less punitive and that males, individuals with less education, individuals who are married, individuals who have higher incomes, and older individuals are expected to be more punitive. As far as the relationship between perceptions about crime, law and order and punitiveness, individuals who perceive their risk of victimization to be high, individuals who perceive the police as ineffective, and individuals who have been victims of violent crime are expected to be more punitive.

Using ICVS data support is found for most of the hypotheses concerning demographics. Model 2, Table 12 reveals males to be significantly more in favor of prison for a recidivist burglar than women and that those who are more educated are significantly less in favor of prison for a repeat burglary offense than those with more education. The odds of choosing a prison sentence for a repeat burglary are 40% higher

for males that females. With each increase in level of education the odds of choosing a prison sentence as punishment for a second burglary offense decrease by 7%. Those who are married are significantly more in favor of prison for a repeat offense of burglary. The odds that married individuals choose a prison sentence are 8% higher than the odds that unmarried individuals choose a prison sentence.

Contrary to expectation, younger individuals tend to be more in favor of prison for a second burglary offense than older individuals. Specifically, those younger than 40 years of age appear to be more punitive in terms of punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar than those above the age of 40. Also, unexpectedly, model 2, Table 12 shows that individuals with incomes above the median are significantly less in favor of prison for repeat non-violent offenses than those with lower incomes. Specifically those with incomes above the median income in their country of residence have 11% lower odds of opting for a prison sentence as punishment for a second offense of burglary than those with incomes that fall below the median income of their country.

Now turning to the relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness, all of the hypotheses concerning this relationship are supported by the ICVS data. There is a positive and significant relationship between perceived risk of burglary and preference for prison as a punishment for a repeat burglar. As one's perceived risk of criminal victimization shifts from not very likely to likely or likely to very likely, the odds that they choose a prison sentence for the second offense of burglary increases by 12.5%. There is also a positive and significant relationship between previous violent victimization and choosing a prison sentence for a second burglary conviction. Those who have been violently victimized are nearly 13% more likely to choose a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar than those who have not experienced violent victimization. There is no significant relationship between nonviolent victimization and

preferring a prison sentence for a repeat burglar. Finally, those who perceive the police as ineffective are significantly more likely to prefer a prison sentence for a second conviction of burglary. The odds of choosing a prison sentence are 16.5% higher for those who perceive the police as ineffective compared to those who do not share this perception.

Model 2, table 13 displays additional tests of some of the individual-level hypotheses on the relationship between demographics and punitiveness and perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness using VPMS data. Model 2, Table 13 also contains the results of testing the hypotheses concerning conservative religious belief, religiosity and punitiveness. To reiterate these hypotheses, it is expected that individuals who hold conservative religious beliefs will be more punitive that those who do not while individuals with higher levels of religiosity will be less punitive than those with lower levels of religiosity. Support is found for all of the individual-level hypotheses tested with the VPMS data.

As found with the ICVS data males, married individuals, some younger individuals, and people who are more concerned about crime are significantly more punitive while individuals with higher levels of education are significantly less punitive. The odds of favoring the death penalty are 37% higher for males than females. Those who are married have 40% higher odds of supporting the death penalty than those who are not married. Individuals between the ages of 25 and 34 are significantly more in favor of the death penalty that those between the ages of 45 and 54. The odds that those between the ages of 25 and 34 indicate support for the death penalty are 16.5% higher than the odds that those between the ages of 45 and 54 will report support for the death penalty. In terms of the relationship between education and punitiveness, each increase in

level of education corresponds with a 13% decrease in the odds of favoring the death penalty.

Table 12. The Unconditional and Individual-Level Only Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models for Preference for Prison.

	Model 1		Model 2		
Demographics	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio		SE
Male			1.408	***	-0.031
Education			0.93	***	-0.005
Age 16 – 19			1.311	**	-0.087
Age 20 – 24			1.394	***	-0.078
Age 25 – 29			1.509	***	-0.063
Age 30 – 34			1.382	***	-0.06
Age 35 – 39			1.353	***	-0.059
Age 40 – 44			1.106		-0.063
Age 50 – 54			0.945		-0.062
Age 55 – 59			1.039		-0.066
Age 60 – 64			1.024		-0.072
Age 65 – 69			1.141		-0.078
Age 70+			1.126		-0.065
Income (> median)			0.889	***	-0.032
Married			1.078	*	-0.031
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order					
Perceived Risk of Burglary			1.125	***	-0.025
Victim of Violent Crime			1.128	**	-0.04
Victim of Non-violent Crime			0.951		-0.028
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness			1.165	***	-0.041
Intercept (coefficient)	-0.855 ***	-0.195	-1.186	***	-0.217
Country-Level Variance	0.72 ***		0.821	***	

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

Table 13. The Unconditional and Individual-Level Only Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models for Support for the Death Penalty

	Model 1		Model 2		
Demographics	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio		SE
Male			1.372	***	-0.043
Education			0.872	***	-0.029
Age Under 18			1.023		-0.119
Age 18 – 24			1.139		-0.074
Age 25 – 34			1.166	*	-0.068
Age 35 – 44			1.08		-0.065
Age 55 – 64			1.001		-0.071
Age 65+			0.985		-0.067
Married/Living Together			1.4	***	-0.056
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order					
Crime Concern			1.359	***	-0.03
Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity					
Personal God			1.248	**	-0.087
Spirit or Life Force			1.081		-0.078
Don't Know What to Think About God			1.036		-0.089
Religiosity			0.949	***	-0.006
Catholic			0.832	***	-0.046
Intercept (coefficient)	-0.127	-0.373	-0.506	*	-0.228
Country-Level Variance	0.714	***	0.815	***	

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

Turning to another examination of the relationship between perceptions of crime, law and order and punitiveness, analyses based on the VPMS data reveal that those who are personally more concerned about crime are significantly more likely to favor the death penalty. For every increase in level of personal concern about crime, the odds of

declaring support for the death penalty increase by 36%. With regard to the relationship between conservative religious belief and punitiveness analyses reveal that those who believe in a personal God, a belief consistent with conservative protestant belief especially when personal level of religiosity is controlled for, are significantly more in favor of the death penalty that those who do not believe in any God. In fact, those who believe in a personal God have 25% higher odds of supporting the death penalty than those who do not believe in any God. It is worth noting that no significant difference is found between individuals who believe in a spirit or life force or don't know what to think about God and those who do not believe in any God in terms of support for the for the death penalty. Also consistent with expectation, each increase in degree of personal religiosity corresponds with a 5% decrease in the odds of favoring the death penalty. Being Catholic also decreases the odds of support for the death penalty by 17%.

Beyond revealing the individual-level factors that are significantly related to punitiveness, model 2 in both Tables 13 and 14 also indicate a larger variance component compared to the unconditional model, or model 1. This means that after controlling for individual-level predictors of punitiveness, there is more variation between countries in public punitiveness. This also indicates that the individual-level predictors of punitiveness are not particularly helpful in explaining any of the variation in public punitiveness across countries. If the variance component of model 2 was smaller than the variance component in model 1, some of the between-country variance in punitiveness would be attributable to the individual-level predictors. However, this is not the case.

Now that the variation between countries in punitiveness has been described and statistically established and individual-level influences on punitiveness have been considered, it is time to investigate the role that social context plays in shaping individual attitudes toward criminal punishment. The next two chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) illustrate

and interpret estimates of further expanded models to those presented in the Tables 13 and 14. These expanded conditional models consider contextual or country-level influences on punitiveness and test the country-level hypotheses that stem from the multi-level model of punitiveness presented in Chapter 2.

Chapter 5: Testing the Multi-Level Model of Punitiveness on Punishment Preferences for a Recidivist Burglar

This chapter reports the results of a full test of the multi-level model of punitiveness presented in Chapter 2 using the ICVS data. This chapter is an extension of the analyses started in Chapter 4 with ICVS data (Table 12). Chapter 4, Table 12 is dedicated to testing the individual-level aspects of the multi-level model of punitiveness presented in Chapter 2. This chapter adds to those results with an investigation of the role that social context plays in shaping individual attitudes about the appropriate punishment of a recidivist burglar.

Specifically, this chapter is focused on uncovering the expected relationships between each of the following types of contextual-level factors and punitiveness measured as punishment preferences for a repeat burglar: (1) objective reality of crime (2) socially constructed realities of crime (3) conservative climate (4) population diversity. To briefly review the hypotheses concerning the social context and punitiveness outlined in Chapter 2 the following is a list of expected relationships between the social context at the country level and punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar. It is expected that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates; individuals who live in countries where law and order is a significant political issue; individuals who live in countries where public perceptions of police ineffectiveness are more common; individuals who live in countries with higher levels of political conservatism; individuals who live in countries where conservative religious belief is more common; individuals who live in countries that are ethnically diverse; individuals who live in countries that are religiously diverse and individuals who live in

countries with higher levels of income inequality will be more punitive and thus prefer a prison sentence for a repeat burglar.

The results of hierarchical logistic regression analyses used to test these hypotheses are displayed in Table 14. As predicted, model 3 of Table 14 reveals a significant relationship between the objective reality of crime and individual punitiveness indicating that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates have significantly higher odds of choosing a prison sentence for a repeat burglar. Further, homicide rate explains 15% of the variation in public support for sentencing recidivist burglars to prison.

Model 4, Table 14 shows mixed support for a significant relationship between socially constructed realities of crime and individual punitiveness. Public perceptions of police as ineffective is not significantly related to punitiveness while law and order as a political issue is positively and significantly related to punitiveness. This indicates that individuals who live in countries with more exposure to law and order messages have significantly higher odds of preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar compared to individuals living in countries where law and order messages are less prominent. Law and order as a political issue fairs better that homicide rate in explaining variation in punitiveness across Western societies. Specifically, law and order as a political issue explains 22% of the variability across Western societies in the type of punishment preferred for a repeat burglar.

Model 5, Table 14 suggests no significant relationship between conservative climate and punitiveness; however, it appears that model 5 simultaneously explains nothing and everything about variation in punitiveness across Western societies. Despite no significant relationship found between political conservatism and punitiveness nor conservative religious belief and punitiveness, these contextual measures appear to

explain a higher proportion of the variation in punitiveness across countries than homicide rate considered alone or law and order as a political issue considered alone. This is indicated by a smaller variance component associated with model 5 than models 3 and 4 (.471 versus .612 and .557, respectively). Further, the consideration of conservative climate as an influence on punitiveness renders insignificant all previously significant individual-level predictors of punitiveness.

Similar results are evident when the relationships between country-level political conservatism and punitiveness and the relationship between conservative religious belief and punitiveness are considered separately. Thus, it appears that political conservatism and conservative religious belief at the country-level explain individual-level differences in punitiveness but do not help to explain differences in punitiveness across Western societies.

However, since conservative religious belief was measured with a scale comprised of the sum of the prevalence of three separate religious beliefs, the relationships between each of these beliefs and punitiveness can be explored further. To this end three supplements to model 5 (model 5a, 5b, and 5c) are estimated, one for each religious belief represented in the conservative religious belief scale. The beliefs included in the conservative religious belief scale include: (1) belief in a literal hell (2) belief in sin and (3) belief in absolute standards of good and evil. Finally, a fourth model (model 5d) is estimated to further evaluate the relationship between country-level conservative religious belief and punitiveness. This model evaluated the relationship between church attendance and punitiveness. Initially, country-level church attendance was conceptualized as a control variable, however country-level church attendance is too highly correlated ($r > .80$) with the prevalence of each conservative religious belief being explored to evaluate the relationships between country-level conservative religious belief

and punitiveness controlling for country-level church attendance. Thus, the relationship between country-level church attendance and punitiveness is tested separately in model 5d.

Model 5a, Table 14 reveals that the percent of the population who believes in hell is significantly and positively related to punitiveness. Those who live in countries where a higher proportion of the population believes in hell have higher odds of preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar than those who live in countries with a lower proportion of the population to believe in a literal hell. Further, belief in a literal hell at the country-level explains nearly 22% of the variation in public punitiveness between Western societies.

Similarly, model 5b in Table 14 indicates that the percent of the population who believes in absolute standards of good and evil is positively and significantly related to individual punitiveness. Those who live in societies with a higher proportion of the population that believe in absolute standards of good and evil have higher odds of choosing a prison sentence for a second conviction of burglary than individuals who live in societies where a lower proportion of the population believes in absolute standards of good and evil. Country-level belief in absolute standards of evil accounts for 17.5% of country variation across Western societies. Contrary to the other findings for singular country-level conservative religious beliefs, country-level belief in sin is not significantly related to individual punitiveness (see Model 5c).

Model 6, Table 14 considers the relationship between population diversity and individual punitiveness. The types of population diversity tested as potential predictors of punitiveness include: ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity and income inequality. The results reveal that only religious heterogeneity is positively and significantly related to individual punitiveness. Individuals who live in more religiously heterogeneous

societies have significantly higher odds of preferring a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar than individuals who live in more religiously homogeneous societies. Net of individual factors and taking into account any relationships between ethnic heterogeneity and punitiveness and income inequality and punitiveness, religious heterogeneity explains nearly 33% of the variation in punitiveness across Western societies in terms of punishment preferences for a second conviction of burglary.

To summarize, the analyses thus far indicate that homicide rate, law and order as a political issue, belief in a literal hell, and religious heterogeneity are all positively related to individual-level punitiveness when considered on their own. Belief in absolute standards of good and evil is also positively related to punitiveness, but belief in hell is considered a stronger measure of conservative religious belief due to its smaller p-value (p=.009) and that it alone explains a higher proportion of variation in punitiveness across Western countries than belief in absolute standards of good and evil. Therefore, belief in absolute standards of good and evil is not considered in further analyses.

Analyses now turn to comparing country-level predicators in their ability to explain variance across Western societies in punishment preferences for a second burglary. Model 7, Table 14 investigates the comparative explanatory power of religious heterogeneity and belief in hell. Both remain positive and statistically significant predictors of individual punitiveness and together explain nearly 43% of the variation in punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar. Model 8 reveals religious heterogeneity and law and order as a political issue to be significant and positive predictors of individual-level punitiveness. The significance of the relationship between punitiveness and law and order as a political issue is marginal (p=.052), however, since the sample size is only 19 one could argue that this is a significant finding rather than marginally significant finding. However, law and order as a political issue is not nearly as helpful in

explaining variation in punitiveness across Western societies compared to the joint effect of religious heterogeneity or belief in hell. Religious heterogeneity and law and order as a political issue considered in the same model explain 39.72% of the variation in individual punitiveness across countries. Model 9, Table 14 reveals that when both religious heterogeneity and homicide are considered together, religious heterogeneity remains a significant predictor of individual punitiveness while homicide rate does not.

Model 10, Table 14 is a visual representation of what happens when two highly correlated variables are included in the same model, in this case homicide rate and law and order as a political issue. The high correlation between homicide rate and law and order as a political issue ($r = .40$) yields insignificant results in a model including both predictors of punitiveness. This suggests that countries that have higher homicide rates are also countries where law and order is a significant political issue. The significant decrease in the coefficient for homicide rate suggests that law and order as a political issue partially mediates the relationship between the homicide rate and individual punitiveness. These findings suggest that the extent to which law and order becomes a political issue is a reflection of the homicide rate and is not socially constructed by politicians and the media independent of the crime rate. It is likely that the public becomes aware of the level of objective risk of victimization to the extent to which politicians and the media call for more "law and order" in order to decrease the crime rate or "fix" the crime problem. Nonetheless, while model 10 sheds light on whether socially constructed realities or objective realities of crime shape punitiveness, these types of contextual factors are not the strongest explanatory factors for variation in punitiveness across Western societies in terms of preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Instead, it is those individuals who are living in more religiously heterogeneous societies and where belief in hell is more prominent that have the highest odds of preferring a prison

sentence for a recidivist burglar. These factors are above and beyond the roles demographic or perceptions of crime, law and order play in determining attitudes toward punishment.

Table 14a. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison (Odds Ratios) [Extension of Model 12, Ch.4]

	Model 3		**Model 4**		**Model 5**		**Model 5a**	
County-Level Variables	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE
Objective Reality of Crime								
Homicide Rate	1.582 *	(.174)						
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime								
Law and Order as a Political Issue			1.003 *	(.182)				
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness			0.989	(.001)				
Conservative Climate								
Political Conservatism					1.027	(.022)		
Conservative Religious Belief					1.046	(.045)		
Belief in Hell							1.027 **	(.009)
Belief in Absolute Standards of Good and Evil								
Belief in Sin								
Church Attendance								
Population Diversity								
Ethnic Heterogeneity								
Religious Heterogeneity								
Income Inequality								
Individual-Level Variables								
Demographics								
Male	1.408 ***	(.031)	1.408 ***	(.031)	1.332	(.155)	1.408 ***	(.028)
Education	0.930 ***	(.005)	0.930 ***	(.005)	0.941	(.033)	0.930 ***	(.005)
Age 16 – 19	1.311 **	(.087)	1.311 **	(.087)	1.252	(.145)	1.310 **	(.083)
Age 20 – 24	1.394 ***	(.078)	1.394 ***	(.078)	1.321	(.164)	1.393 ***	(.071)
Age 25 – 29	1.510 ***	(.063)	1.509 ***	(.063)	1.408	(.190)	1.509 ***	(.060)
Age 30 – 34	1.382 ***	(.060)	1.382 ***	(.060)	1.309	(.153)	1.382 ***	(.057)
Age 35 – 39	1.354 ***	(.059)	1.353 ***	(.059)	1.285	(.144)	1.354 ***	(.057)
Age 40 – 44	1.106	(.063)	1.106	(.063)	1.085	(.073)	1.106	(.060)
Age 50 – 54	0.946	(.062)	0.945	(.062)	0.953	(.060)	0.946	(.060)
Age 55 – 59	1.039	(.066)	1.039	(.066)	1.030	(.062)	1.039	(.063)
Age 60 – 64	1.024	(.072)	1.024	(.072)	1.018	(.065)	1.024	(.068)
Age 65 – 70	1.141	(.078)	1.141	(.078)	1.111	(.091)	1.141	(.073)
Age 71 +	1.126	(.065)	1.126	(.065)	1.101	(.079)	1.126	(.062)
Income (Above Median)	0.889 ***	(.032)	0.889 ***	(.032)	0.906	(.061)	0.889 ***	(.030)
Married	1.078 *	(.031)	1.078 *	(.031)	1.065	(.044)	1.077 *	(.030)
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order								
Perceived Risk of Burglary	1.125 ***	(.025)	1.125 ***	(.025)	1.106	(.058)	1.125 ***	(.023)
Victim of Violent Crime	1.128 **	(.040)	1.128 **	(.040)	1.105	(.064)	1.128 **	(.039)
Victim of Nonviolent Crime	0.951	(.028)	0.951	(.028)	0.958	(.034)	0.951	(.028)
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness	1.166 ***	(.041)	1.166 ***	(.041)	1.137	(.079)	1.165 ***	(.041)
Intercept (coefficient)	-1.191 ***	(.189)	-1.888 ***	(.550)	-.989		-1.190 ***	(.182)
Country-Level Variance	0.612 ***		.557 ***		.471 ***		.564 ***	
Percent of Variance Explained	15.00%		22.60%		---		21.67%	

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

Table 14b: Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison – Continued (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 12, Ch.4]

	Model 5b			Model 5c			Model 5d			Model 6		
County-Level Variables	Odds Ratio		SE	Odds Ratio		SE	Odds Ratio		SE	Odds Ratio		SE
Objective Reality of Crime												
Homicide Rate												
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime												
Law and Order as a Political Issue												
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness												
Conservative Climate												
Political Conservatism												
Conservative Religious Belief												
Belief in Hell												
Belief in Absolute Standards of Good and Evil	1.045	*	(.016)									
Belief in Sin				1.019		(.010)						
Church Attendance							1.016		(.013)			
Population Diversity												
Ethnic Heterogeneity										0.566		(.855)
Religious Heterogeneity										8.136	**	(.711)
Income Inequality										1.070		(.039)
Individual-Level Variables												
Demographics												
Male	1.408	***	(.031)	1.408	***	(.031)	1.408	***	(.031)	1.408	***	(.031)
Education	0.930	***	(.005)	0.930	***	(.005)	0.930	***	(.005)	0.930	***	(.005)
Age 16 – 19	1.310	**	(.087)	1.311	**	(.087)	1.311	**	(.087)	1.311	**	(.087)
Age 20 – 24	1.393	***	(.078)	1.394	***	(.078)	1.394	***	(.078)	1.393	***	(.078)
Age 25 – 29	1.509	***	(.063)	1.509	***	(.063)	1.509	***	(.063)	1.509	***	(.063)
Age 30 – 34	1.382	***	(.060)	1.382	***	(.060)	1.382	***	(.060)	1.382	***	(.060)
Age 35 – 39	1.353	***	(.059)	1.353	***	(.059)	1.353	***	(.058)	1.353	***	(.059)
Age 40 – 44	1.106		(.063)	1.106		(.063)	1.106		(.063)	1.106		(.063)
Age 50 – 54	0.946		(.062)	0.945		(.062)	0.946		(.062)	0.946		(.062)
Age 55 – 59	1.039		(.066)	1.039		(.066)	1.039		(.066)	1.039		(.066)
Age 60 – 64	1.024		(.072)	1.024		(.072)	1.024		(.072)	1.024		(.072)
Age 65 – 70	1.141		(.078)	1.141		(.078)	1.141		(.078)	1.141		(.078)
Age 71 +	1.126		(.065)	1.126		(.065)	1.126		(.065)	1.126		(.065)
Income (Above Median)	0.889	***	(.032)	0.889		(.032)	0.889	***	(.032)	0.888	***	(.032)
Married	1.078	*	(.031)	1.078		(.031)	1.078	*	(.031)	1.076	*	(.031)
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order												
Perceived Risk of Burglary	1.125	***	(.025)	1.125	***	(.025)	1.125	***	(.025)	1.125	***	(.025)
Victim of Violent Crime	1.128	**	(.040)	1.128	**	(.040)	1.128	**	(.040)	1.128	**	(.040)
Victim of Nonviolent Crime	0.951		(.028)	0.951		(.028)	0.951		(.034)	0.951		(.028)
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness	1.165	***	(.041)	1.166	***	(.041)	1.165	***	(.041)	1.166	***	(.041)
				-		(.550)	-		(.214)		***	(.170)
Intercept (coefficient)	-1.187	***	(.187)	1.889	***		1.188	***		-1.194		
Country-Level Variance	0.594	***		.713	***		.798	***		.485	***	
Percent of Variance Explained	17.50%			---			---			32.64%		

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

Table 14c. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison – Continued (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 12, Ch.4]

	Model 7			Model 8			Model 9			Model 10		
County-Level Variables	Odds Ratio		SE	Odds Ratio		SE	Odds Ratio		SE	Odds Ratio		SE
Objective Reality of Crime												
Homicide Rate							1.313		(.174)	1.181		(.252)
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime												
Law and Order as a Political Issue				1.002	*	(.001)				1.002		(.002)
Public Perception of Police Ineffectiveness												
Conservative Climate												
Political Conservatism												
Conservative Religious Belief												
Belief in Hell	1.019	*	(.008)									
Belief in Absolute Standards of Good and Evil												
Belief in Sin												
Church Attendance												
Population Diversity												
Ethnic Heterogeneity												
Religious Heterogeneity	5.371	*	(.653)	4.822	*	(.691)	5.500	*	(.728)			
Income Inequality												
Individual-Level Variables												
Demographics												
Male	1.332	***	(.031)	1.408	***	(.031)	1.408	***	(.031)	1.408	***	(.031)
Education	0.941	***	(.005)	0.930	***	(.005)	0.930	***	(.005)	0.930	***	(.005)
Age 16 – 19	1.252	**	(.087)	1.311	**	(.087)	1.311	**	(.087)	1.311	**	(.087)
Age 20 – 24	1.321	***	(.078)	1.394	***	(.078)	1.394	***	(.078)	1.394	***	(.078)
Age 25 – 29	1.408	***	(.063)	1.509	***	(.063)	1.510	***	(.063)	1.510	***	(.063)
Age 30 – 34	1.309	***	(.060)	1.382	***	(.060)	1.382	***	(.060)	1.382	***	(.060)
Age 35 – 39	1.285	***	(.059)	1.353	***	(.059)	1.353	***	(.059)	1.353	***	(.059)
Age 40 – 44	1.085		(.063)	1.106		(.063)	1.106		(.063)	1.106		(.063)
Age 50 – 54	0.953		(.062)	0.945		(.062)	0.945		(.062)	0.945		(.062)
Age 55 – 59	1.030		(.066)	1.039		(.066)	1.039		(.066)	1.039		(.066)
Age 60 – 64	1.018		(.072)	1.024		(.072)	1.024		(.072)	1.024		(.072)
Age 65 – 70	1.111		(.078)	1.141		(.078)	1.141		(.078)	1.141		(.078)
Age 71 +	1.101		(.065)	1.126		(.065)	1.126		(.065)	1.126		(.065)
Income (Above Median)	0.906		(.032)	0.889	***	(.032)	0.889	***	(.032)	0.889	***	(.032)
Married	1.065		(.031)	1.078	*	(.031)	1.078	*	(.031)	1.078	*	(.031)
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order												
Perceived Risk of Burglary	1.106	***	(.025)	1.125	***	(.025)	1.125	***	(.025)	1.125	***	(.025)
Victim of Violent Crime	1.105	**	(.040)	1.128	**	(.040)	1.128	**	(.040)	1.128	**	(.040)
Victim of Nonviolent Crime	0.958		(.028)	0.951		(.028)	0.951		(.028)	0.951		(.028)
Perceived Police Ineffectiveness	1.137	***	(.041)	1.166	***	(.041)	1.166	***	(.041)	1.166	***	(.041)
Intercept (coefficient)	-1.192	***	(.159)	-1.192	***	(.162)	-1.193	***	(.169)	-1.191	***	(.182)
Country-Level Variance	.420			.434	***		0.480	***		0.565	***	
Percent of Variance Explained	41.67%			39.72%			33.33%			21.53%		

$p \leq .05$ * $p \leq .01$ ** $p \leq .001$ ***

Finally, a model was estimated (not shown) with the next logical set of country-level variables included in the model: religious heterogeneity, belief in hell, law and order as a political issue. Due to the high correlations between belief in hell and law and order as a political issue (r=.67) and the small sample size of countries nothing remained significant. The next chapter tests the same multi-level model of punitiveness with data on death penalty attitudes in Western societies.

Chapter 6: Testing the Multi-Level Model of Punitiveness on Death Penalty Attitudes

This chapter reports the results of a full test of the multi-level model of punitiveness presented in Chapter 2 using the VPMS data. This chapter is an extension of the analyses started in Chapter 4 with VPMS data (Table 13). Chapter 4, Table 13 is dedicated to testing the individual-level aspects of the multi-level model of punitiveness presented in Chapter 2. This chapter adds to those results with an investigation of the role that social context plays in shaping individual support for the death penalty.

Specifically, this chapter is focused on uncovering the expected relationships between each of the following types of contextual-level factors and punitiveness measured as support for the death penalty: (1) objective reality of crime (2) socially constructed realities of crime (3) conservative climate (4) population diversity. For a quick review of the hypotheses concerning the relationship between the social context and attitudes toward the death penalty the following is a list of expected relationships between the social context at the country level and attitudes toward the death penalty. It is expected that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates; individuals who live in countries where law and order is a significant political issue; individuals who live in countries where public perceptions of police ineffectiveness are high; individuals who live in countries with higher levels of political conservatism; individuals who live in countries where conservative religious belief is more common; individuals who live in countries that are ethnically diverse; individuals who live in countries that are religiously diverse and individuals who live in countries with higher levels of income inequality will be more punitive and therefore support the use of the death penalty.

The results of hierarchical logistic regression analyses used to test these hypotheses are displayed in Table 15. As predicted, model 3 of Table 15 reveals a

significant relationship between the objective reality of crime and individual punitiveness indicating that individuals who live in countries with higher homicide rates have higher odds of being in favor of the death penalty. Further, homicide rate explains 77.87% of the variation attitudes toward the death penalty across Western societies.

Model 4, Table 15 shows a significant relationship between socially constructed realities of crime and individual punitiveness. Law and order as a political issue is positively and significantly related to punitiveness. This indicates that individuals who live in countries with more exposure to law and order messages have significantly higher odds of favoring the death penalty compared to individuals living in countries where law and order messages are less prominent. Law and order as a political issue explains 62.18% variation in support for the death penalty across Western societies.

Model 5, Table 15 reveals mixed support for a significant relationship between conservative climate and punitiveness in that a climate of conservative religious belief is positively related to support for the death penalty. This finding takes into account any relationship between country-level political conservatism and support for the death penalty which is not a significant predictor of the death penalty once conservative religious belief is considered. Political conservatism at the country-level was initially found to be a positive and significant predictor of support for the death penalty (model not shown) before conservative religious belief at the country-level was taken into account. While countries with higher levels of political conservatism tend to also be countries with higher levels of conservative religious belief (r=.48), it is the context of conservative religious belief that is directly related to support for the death penalty. Model 5a reveals that the relationship between country-level conservative religious belief remains after taking church attendance into account. Unlike the results from the ICVS data, church attendance was significantly and positively related to support for the death

penalty but this relationship did not hold up once country-level conservative religious belief was also considered. Again, countries with higher levels of church attendance tend be countries where conservative religious belief is more prevalent (r = .87***), but it is the context of conservative religious belief that is significantly related to support for the death penalty.

Model 6, Table 15 considers the relationship between population diversity and support for the death penalty. The types of population diversity tested as potential predictors of death penalty attitudes include: ethnic heterogeneity, religious heterogeneity and income inequality. The results reveal that only religious heterogeneity is positively and significantly related to support for the death penalty. Individuals who live in more religiously heterogeneous societies have significantly higher odds of being in favor of the death penalty than individuals who live in more religiously homogeneous societies. Net of individual factors and taking into account any relationships between ethnic heterogeneity and punitiveness and income inequality and punitiveness, religious heterogeneity explains 58.4% of the variation in punitiveness across Western societies in terms of punishment preferences for a second conviction of burglary.

To summarize, the analyses thus far indicate that homicide rate, law and order as a political issue, country-level conservative religious belief, and religious heterogeneity are all positively related to attitudes toward the death penalty when considered separately. Analyses now turn to comparing country-level predicators in their ability to explain variance across Western societies in support for capital punishment. Model 7, Table 15 investigates the comparative explanatory power of country-level conservative religious belief and law and order as a political issue on death penalty attitudes. Only homicide rate remains a statistically significant and positive predictor of support for death penalty. Likewise, models 8 and 9 in Table 15 reveal homicide rate to be the only significant and

positive country-level predictor of support for the death penalty when considered alongside conservative religious belief (model 8) and religious heterogeneity (model 9).

The next and final chapter summarizes and discusses the findings just reported in Chapters 4 through 6.

Table 15a. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Support for the Death Penalty (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 13, Ch.4]

	Model 3		**Model 4**		**Model 5**		**Model 5a**	
County-Level Variables	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE
Objective Reality of Crime								
Homicide Rate	1.582 *	(.174)						
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime								
Law and Order as a Political Issue			1.005 *	(.001)				
Conservative Climate								
Political Conservatism					1.012	(.013)		
Conservative Religious Belief					1.132 ***	(.029)	1.193 *	(.075)
Church Attendance							.988	(.023)
Population Diversity								
Ethnic Heterogeneity								
Religious Heterogeneity								
Income Inequality								
Individual-Level Variables								
Demographics								
Male	1.371 ***	(.043)	1.371 ***	(.043)	1.371 ***	(.043)	1.371 ***	(.043)
Education	0.870 ***	(.029)	0.870 ***	(.029)	0.871 ***	(.029)	0.872 ***	(.029)
Age Under 18	1.036	(.087)	1.023	(.119)	1.027	(.119)	1.024	(.119)
Age 18 – 24	1.141	(.074)	1.138	(.074)	1.139	(.074)	1.138	(.074)
Age 25 – 34	1.166 *	(.068)	1.166 *	(.068)	1.165 *	(.068)	1.165 *	(.068)
Age 35 – 44	1.080	(.065)	1.080	(.065)	1.080	(.065)	1.080	(.065)
Age 55 – 64	1.003	(.071)	1.001	(.071)	1.002	(.071)	1.001	(.071)
Age 65+	0.984	(.067)	0.985	(.068)	.986	(.067)	*.987*	(.067)
Married	1.402 ***	(.056)	1.401 ***	(.056)	1.402 ***	(.056)	1.402 ***	(.056)
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order								
Crime Concern	1.358 ***	(.031)	1.357 ***	(.030)	1.360 ***	(.030)	1.359 ***	(.030)
Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity								
Personal God	1.243 *	(.087)	1.243 *	(.087)	1.243 *	(.087)	1.242 *	(.087)
Spirit or Life Force	1.079	(.077)	1.077	(.077)	1.080	(.077)	1.079	(.077)
Don't Know What to Think About God	1.035	(.089)	1.035	(.089)	1.035	(.089)	1.035	(.089)
Religiosity	.949 ***	(.006)	.949 ***	(.006)	0.949 ***	(.006)	0.949 ***	(.006)
Catholic	.837 ***	(.048)	.838 ***	(.046)	0.831 ***	(.046)	0.832 ***	(.046)
Intercept (coefficient)	-1.033 ***	(.149)	-1.149 ***	(.202)	-1.125 ***	(.190)	-1.198 ***	(.189)
Country-Level Variance	0.158 ***		0.270 ***		.284 ***		.295 ***	
Percent of Variance Explained	77.87%		62.18%		60.22%		58.68%	

$p \leq .05$ *$p \leq .01$ **$p \leq .001$***

Table 15b. Hierarchical Logistic Regression Models Predicting Preference for Prison – Continued (Odds Ratios)[Extension of Model 13, Ch.4]

	Model 6		Model 7		Model 8		Model 9	
County-Level Variables	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE	Odds Ratio	SE
Objective Reality of Crime								
Homicide Rate			1.388 **	(.098)	1.375 **	(.099)	1.389 **	(.086)
Socially Constructed Realities of Crime								
Law and Order as a Political Issue			1.001	(.001)				
Conservative Climate								
Political Conservatism								
Conservative Religious Belief					1.037	(.038)		
Church Attendance								
Population Diversity								
Ethnic Heterogeneity	1.087	(.859)						
Religious Heterogeneity	11.653 *	(.873)					2.003	(.799)
Income Inequality	1.062	(.056)						
Individual-Level Variables								
Demographics								
Male	1.372 ** *	(.043)	1.371 ** *	(.043)	1.370 ** *	(.043)	1.370 ** *	(.043)
Education	0.870 ** *	(.023)	0.869 ** *	(.029)	0.870 ** *	(.029)	0.870 ** *	(.029)
Age Under 18	1.023	(.119)	1.034	(.118)	1.035	(.118)	1.034	(.118)
Age 18 – 24	1.138	(.074)	1.140	(.074)	1.140	(.074)	1.140	(.074)
Age 25 – 34	1.166 *	(.068)	1.166 *	(.068)	1.166 *	(.068)	1.166 *	(.068)
Age 35 – 44	1.080	(.065)	1.080	(.065)	1.080	(.065)	1.080	(.065)
Age 55 – 64	1.001	(.071)	1.003	(.071)	1.003	(.070)	1.003	(.071)
Age 65+	.985	(.067)	.984	(.068)	.985	(.067)	.984	(.067)
Married	1.401 ** *	(.055)	1.402 ** *	(.056)	1.402 ** *	(.056)	1.402 ** *	(.056)
Perceptions of Crime, Law and Order								
Crime Concern	1.358 ** *	(.030)	1.358 ** *	(.030)	1.359 ** *	(.030)	1.358 ** *	(.031)
Conservative Religious Belief and Religiosity								
Personal God	1.246 *	(.087)	1.242 *	(.087)	1.241 *	(.087)	1.243 *	(.087)
Spirit or Life Force	1.080	(.077)	1.078	(.077)	1.078	(.077)	1.078	(.077)
Don't Know What to Think About God	1.036	(.089)	1.035	(.089)	1.034	(.089)	1.035	(.089)
Religiosity	0.949 ** *	(.006)	0.949 ** *	(.006)	0.948 ** *	(.006)	0.949 ** *	(.006)
Catholic	0.835 ** *	(.046)	0.838 ** *	(.046)	0.835 ** *	(.046)	0.838 ** *	(.046)
Intercept (coefficient)	-1.291 ** *	(.219)	-0.159 ** *	(.177)	-1.083 ** *	(.147)	-1.092 ** *	(.172)
Country-Level Variance	.297 ** *		.162 ** *		.151 ** *		.155 ** *	
Percent of Variance Explained	58.40 %		77.31 %		78.85%		78.29%	

$p \leq .05$ $^{*}p \leq .01$ $^{**}p \leq .001$ ***

Chapter 7: Conclusion and Discussion

This dissertation research expands the criminological and sociological literature on punitiveness by developing and testing a multi-level model of punitiveness designed to apply across Western societies. This model was tested on data from two multi-national datasets, each with a unique measure of punitiveness. The individual-level model within the multi-level model of punitiveness faired considerably well for both measures of punitiveness: (1) punishment preferences for a second burglary conviction and (2) support for the death penalty. The demographics, personal beliefs and perceptions, and personal experiences commonly found to be associated with punitiveness or hypothesized to influence punitiveness within the U.S. were also found to be associated with punitiveness across Western societies in similar ways.

Hierarchical logistic regression models revealed that males residing in Western societies and married individuals residing in Western societies tend to favor of prison for a recidivist burglar and are more supportive of the death penalty than women. Those with more education were found to be less in favor of prison for a recidivist burglar as well as less in favor of the death penalty. Age and income did not operate as expected across Western societies. Younger individuals were found to be more in favor of a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar than older individuals and some younger individuals (those ages 25 to 34) indicated more support for the death penalty. Those with incomes above the median tended to be less in favor of prison for a recidivist burglar compared to those with incomes below the median. However, the relationship between age and punitiveness is not consistent in the previous literature on punitiveness. Further, the measure for income from the ICVS was less than ideal in only distinguishing between incomes that fall above and below the median. If income had been measured in a

standardized way and/or as a continuous variable a positive relationship between income and punitiveness may have been detected.

In addition, results showed that those who perceive their risk of victimization to be high or who are personally concerned about crime tend to be more in favor of prison for a recidivist burglar and more supportive of the death penalty while individuals who hold negative evaluations of the police and individuals who are prior victims of violent crime are also more in favor of prison for a repeat burglar. Finally, results revealed that individuals who believe in a personal God tend to be more in favor of the death penalty compared to individuals with no belief in God while individuals who identify as Catholic and individuals who have higher levels of religiosity are less supportive of the death penalty.

The finding that individuals who have been victims of violent crime tend to be more punitive is especially noteworthy because the punitiveness literature is full of studies where researchers predict a positive relationship between prior criminal victimization and punitiveness for instrumental reasons but results generate a null finding. This is likely because the operationalization of prior criminal victimization in previous research has not distinguished between violent and non-violent victimization. This research underscores the importance of measuring prior victimization more precisely in future research on punitiveness.

Beyond exploring individual-level influences on attitudes towards punishment in Western societies, this research powerfully illustrates the strong variation in public punitiveness that exists across Western countries and considers how differences in the national social context can influence individual attitudes toward criminal punishment. Public support for prison as an appropriate punishment for a recidivist burglar ranges from 10.5% in Austria to 64% in the U.S. and support for the death penalty ranges from

13.4% in Iceland to 68% in the U.S. This dissertation considered how the objective reality of crime, socially constructed realities of crime, conservative climate and population diversity may help explain the variation across Western countries in attitudes toward criminal punishment.

While controlling for compositional effects and individual-level influences on attitudes toward criminal punishment, which alone were not helpful in explaining variation in punitiveness across Westerns societies, hierarchical logistic regression models revealed that the two indicators of punitiveness, punishment preference for a recidivist burglar and support for the death penalty, varied as to which aspects of the social context were most helpful in explaining their variation across Western societies. Four aspects of the social context were considered as potential predictors of individual-level punitiveness: (1) objective realities of crime (2) socially constructed realities of crime (3) conservative climate and (4) population diversity.

Variation across Western societies in support for prison for a recidivist burglar is best explained by religious heterogeneity and belief in hell at the country level. A series of hierarchical logistic regression models revealed these two aspects of the social context to remain significant when considered together as potential influences on individual attitudes toward criminal punishment in Western societies. Both religious heterogeneity and belief in hell at the country level have a positive and significant relationship with individual punitiveness. Further, religious heterogeneity and country-level belief in a literal hell account for 42% of the variation in preference for prison for a second burglary conviction that is observed across Western societies with the ICVS data. These findings suggest that individuals who live in Western societies that are more religiously heterogeneous and individuals who live in Western societies with a higher proportion of

the population that believes in hell are more likely to favor prison as an appropriate punishment for a recidivist burglar.

The increased levels of in-group interaction between people of different religious backgrounds associated with higher levels of religious heterogeneity be it direct interaction such as day-to-day public encounters or indirect interaction from elites and the media may breed anxiety and mistrust due to a perceived moral inferiority of religious groups to which one does not belong or relate to. This may ultimately lead to preferences for increased punishment for criminal behavior that can be construed as demonstrated acts of immorality.

Also the proportion of the population that believes in hell may indicate the degree to which a culture subscribes to notions of retribution. Not all conservative religious beliefs considered in this research were found to be positively and significantly related to preference for prison for a recidivist burglar. Beliefs in absolute standards of good and evil and sin do not directly invoke ideas of punishment as an end in itself. These beliefs acknowledge the existence of evil and wrongdoing but do not indicate a specific response or punishment for evil behavior, sin or wrongdoing whereas a literal hell by its very definition is an eternal punishment for varying degrees of wrongdoing. Individuals that live in societies where belief in a literal hell is more common may be more likely to punish criminals more harshly whether they are burglars or murderers simply because they believe these criminals simply deserve it.

By contrast, variation in support for the death penalty across Western societies is best explained by the homicide rate and homicide rate accounts for over 75% of the variation in capital punishment attitudes across Western societies. While law and order as a political issue, religious heterogeneity and conservative religious belief were initially each positively and significantly related to support for the death penalty, all of these

relationships became statistically insignificant once they were considered in the same model with homicide rate.

Since the odds ratio for homicide rate decreases (see Table 15, Chapter 6) when each of the above country-level factors were considered alongside homicide rate, homicide rate may partially mediate the relationship between religious heterogeneity and punitiveness as well as mediate the relationship between conservative religious belief and punitiveness. These mediations may be very partial as the reduction in the coefficient of homicide rate is quite modest. Countries with higher levels of religious heterogeneity may have higher homicide rates which leads to more punitiveness due either to the normality of conflict and violent between religious groups or due to instrumental concerns and wanting to reduce the prospect of future criminal victimization.

More plausibly, based on work by Jensen (2006) and a slightly larger reduction in the odds ratio for homicide rate when conservative religious belief is considered alongside homicide rate in a model predicting support for the death penalty, homicide rate may mediate the relationship between country levels of conservative religious belief and punitiveness. Jensen (2006) argues that countries with higher levels of conservative religious belief such as a cosmic duality between good and evil where God and the Devil are constantly in conflict with each other are also countries with more interpersonal conflict which is likely to lead to more instances of confrontation with that an increased potential of being resolved with interpersonal violence. In societies where resolving conflict with violence is more the norm than the exception are likely to be more comfortable with criminal punishments involving physical violence including the death penalty.

Baumer et al. (2003) in their multi-level analysis of support for the death penalty in the U.S. that focused on the influence of neighborhood context on the support for the

death penalty found that controlling for compositional effects, individuals living in neighborhoods that were more politically conservative, had a larger black population and higher homicide rate were significantly more in favor of the death penalty. Social contextual influences of political conservatism and population diversity at the national level were considered as potential predictors of individual support for the death penalty across Western societies based on the Baumer et al. (2003) study but the latter two findings of the Baumer et al. (2003) did not translate well when applied to Western societies even after seemingly translatable measures were utilized (ethnic heterogeneity for racial threat and percent voting conservative for political conservatism). Perhaps this is not too surprising.

The U.S. has a very unique history of race relations that cannot realistically be compared to the race relations of other Western societies. The U.S. also has a very unique two-party political system unlike any other Western political system that most likely yields a U.S.-specific version of political conservatism not easily applied to other Western societies. However, homicide rate is comparable across Western societies. There may be differences among Western countries to the extent to which the positive relationship between country-level homicide rate and punitiveness is due to the degree of normality of violence or instrumental concerns about violent crime and desire to prevent further violent crime. Both explanations are likely to apply perhaps in varying degrees to all Western societies.

Future research should continue to identify contextual-level factors that may explain country-level differences in public punitiveness in Western society with an eye to factors that are universal to Western societies. The U.S. may complicate cross-national comparisons with other Western countries and researchers should remain cognizant of this in future research in this area. One avenue for future research on cross-national

differences in punitiveness is to compare how crime is treated in the media across Western societies and examine how its portrayal may influence individual attitudes toward punishment. Unnever and Cullen (2009) are likely on a right track by focusing on stereotypical images of offenders as a powerful influence on individual attitudes toward punishment. Future research should examine how those stereotypical images are developed and disseminated by the media and find a way to measure this cross-nationally to determine how these images influence punitiveness. This is one challenging possibility for furthering our understanding of cross-national variation in public punitiveness.

It may also be fruitful to investigate how influential direct measures of media focus on crime may be related to individual attitudes toward punishment. One way this could be done is through an on-line news database like Lexis-Nexus were national news media sources for the appropriate country and time period can be downloaded and subject to content analysis. One obstacle to this research is language. Ideally, a multicultural team of researchers would analyze news sources in their native language in order to get the full context of cultural messages about crime and punishment.

One crude way of measuring crime in the media through Lexis-Nexis in the absence of a multicultural team of researchers is to translate the word "crime" into multiple languages associated with the countries of interest. Then "crime" can be searched to obtain counts for the number of new stories for which "crime" is mentioned by each newspaper per day, week, or month or time period identified as most appropriate. Much of the context of these stories would be lost but general measures of the degree to which crime is mentioned and given attention in the media could be generated. It would be interesting to see if such a crude measure would produce significant variation across countries and whether it could help explain variation in attitudes towards punishment across countries. It is possible that a crude measure of attention to crime and punishment

in the media is significantly correlated to the country-level measure of crime as a political issue used in this study. This is should be explored by future research.

Future research on punitiveness should incorporate the novelties of the current research while also addressing its limitations. This research has established the importance of religion as both a protective factor and risk factor for generating punitive attitudes at both the individual-level and contextual-level. Conservative religious belief at the country-level and the way religion is socially constructed in society has been shown to at least indirectly influence, if not directly influence attitudes toward punishment. Both conservative religious belief at the country-level and religious population heterogeneity were found to significantly and positively influence one if not the other measure of punitive attitudes in this study. Individual-level religiosity is found to be negatively related to support for the death penalty while individual-level conservative religious belief were found to be positively related to support for the death penalty.

Future research on attitudes toward criminal punishment should considering both the individual and contextual influences and consider religion's role in shaping attitudes toward punishment whenever possible. A standardized cross-national measure of political conservatism should be developed. Political conservatism as it exists in the US may not exist outside of the U.S. but a cross-national measure of political conservatism should still be explored in future study designs. Some of the more puzzling results (e.g. political conservatism at the country-level not explaining cross-national variation in punitiveness, but explaining away previously significant relationships between individual-level predictors and punitiveness) from this research may have been due to the fact that political conservatism nor religiosity could not be taken into account in the multi-level model of punitiveness on punishment preferences for a recidivist burglar due to limitations in the data

One limitation of studying variation in punitiveness among Western societies empirically is that there are only so many Western countries and thus the sample size will always small. Ideally future research would find a way to overcome this limitation. Eventually when country-level data quality permits, non-Western countries should be considered in cross-national studies of public punitiveness.

This dissertation tested several explanations of variation in punitiveness already presented in the literature but the model of punitiveness developed in this dissertation did not represent a theory but instead was a tested of what previous research has indicated should be significantly related to punitiveness and also delved into uncharted territory with the consideration of religious heterogeneity and conservative religious belief at the country-level, however, more theory needs to be developed in this area. Unnever and Cullen (2009) are pioneers in theorizing punitiveness but much more work needs to be done. This research has confirmed that the social context matters in influencing attitudes toward criminal punishment. This raises the possibility of cross-level interactions between individual and country-level predictors of punitiveness. However, without any truly testable theory of public punitiveness available, there is little justification for exploring cross-level interactions between country and individual-level factors in predicting punitiveness at this time.

Overall, this research greatly enhances our understanding of the individual and social contextual influences on punitiveness and illustrates how social context can have varying influence on attitudes toward punishment based on the indicator of punitiveness being studied. But to reiterate, the multi-level model of punitiveness developed for and tested in this dissertation and to be applied to Western societies is not a full or exhaustive model. Plenty of variation across Western societies in punitiveness remains to be explained even after controlling for individual-level or compositional influences and

considering the contextual factors such as objective reality of crime, socially constructed realities of crime, conservative climate and population diversity. Ultimately, this dissertation research provides a stepping off place for looking at an endless number of country-level contextual effects on individual attitudes toward punishment and other individual-level attitudes related to criminology. This avenue of research is only limited by individual outcomes of interest the availability of country-level data.

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